Osemeka Anthony
ID UAD7638HBY14286
Conflict Management and Resolution
(Course Work)
PhD in Psychology
Atlantic International University
School of Social and Human Studies
Table of contents
Table of content-----------------------------------------------------------------------------2
Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------------------3
Sources and causes of conflict in Africa-------------------------------------------------4-24
Common factor in ethnic conflicts in Africa--------------------------------------------24-26
Ethnic conflicts in Africa: A case study of Nigeria and South Africa---------------26-40
Schmid’s Typology of Global Conflicts-------------------------------------------------40-45
Communication and Conflict Management----------------------------------------------46-48
Elements of Conflict Management Process----------------------------------------------48-65
Resolving Violent Conflict Situation: A case study of Liberia War------------------65-71
Conclusion------------------------------------------------------------------------------------72s
References
Introduction
We normally share good relations with people we get along with and people who are like to us or whom we understand. People whom we don’t understand, we normally don’t get along with them. Most of our conflicts occur with people who are different from us. They have different views, perceptions, mannerisms, likes or dislikes, response mechanisms or priorities, or maybe they think or behave differently. These differences lead to conflicts and conflict lead to disappointments, demoralization, depression, hurt, resentment, anger, stress and disinterest and dislike for people and subsequently work. Conflict does have their positive aspects as well as we get to see and listen to perspectives different from ours, thereby getting new and fresh ideas and inputs. However, not all of us are able to capitalise on this positive aspect of conflicts. Conflict is a characteristic of human existence. It is part of the dynamic of life that drives us into the future. But it needs to be managed constructively. When associated with violence, destruction and killing, it is no longer a healthy part of living. Violent conflict solves few problems, creates many, and breeds more unhealthy conflict to come. When conflict is understood, it's easier to find ways to predict it, prevent it, transform it, and resolve it.
Sources of conflict
Several researchers on conflicts centered mostly on who is involved in the conflicts and not the initiator of the conflict (source). Gleditsch, Christiansen & Hegre (2004), found that studying conflict initiation is of limited value, because existing data about conflict initiation may be especially unreliable. Reiter and Stam (2003) posited that autocracies initiate conflicts against democracies more frequently than democracies do against autocracies. Quackenbush and Rudy (2006), while confirming Reiter and Stam's results, found that democracies initiate wars against nondemocracies more frequently than nondemocracies do to each other. Peceny el at, (2004), (Lai & Slater 2006) found that the different types of autocracies with different institutions vary regarding conflict initiation. Personality and military dictatorships may be particularly prone to conflict initiation, as compared to other types of autocracy such as one party states, but also more likely to be targeted in a war having other initiators. Stedman cited in Onyike (2003:51) while writing on sources of conflict in Africa posited that: “Conflicts in Africa arise from basic problem to all population: the tugs and pulls of different identities, the distribution of resources and access to power, and competing definitions of what is right, fair and just”. One can rightly say then that societies have always been in potential or actual conflict because while some segments of the population yearn for change to fulfill their needs and allay their fears, others fear change from their political position as it may pose danger and threats to their political and other interests. Again, one cannot but also make necessary recourse to colonialism as source of most causes of African conflicts. Although colonialism is no longer here, its embers are still very much staring us in the face. It does not require a “fortuneteller” to note that most of the countries that emerged at independence could best be described as petty states, extremely vulnerable to external pressures and internal disruptions. However, it will be pretty unfair blaming the whole problem on colonialism and the colonial masters, after all, decades have passed without any significant progress made. African leaders too are to be blamed. Immediately after independence, indigenous African leaders that emerged saw the trade unions, student bodies and other progressive forces whose sacrifices brought independence as threats to national unity. This opened a new chapter in the history of violent conflicts in Africa or indeed a paradigm shift from anti-colonial or decolonization struggles to activists- national government face-offs. The latter is still a vibrant source of violent conflicts across Africa today. The bane of this conflict, over time, remains injustice on the side of the government. One other fundamental and perennial source of conflicts in Africa is the adoption or recognition of the sanctity or inviolability of the state boundaries left by the colonial masters by Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1964. Socio-political and ethno-national marriages of inconveniences put in place by the colonial masters continue to witch haunt African political stability till date.
The issues of conflict
1. Conflicts arise when people are competing for the same resources (such as territory, jobs and income, housing) when they aren't fairly distributed or when there aren't enough to go round. The same applies to natural resources (cultivable land, fresh water).
2. Conflicts arise when the people are unhappy with how they are governed. The most common conflicts occur when a particular group wants to be independent from a central government, or when their viewpoint isn't represented in the government, or when the government oppresses them and doesn't respect or meet their basic needs.
3. Conflicts arise when people's beliefs clash. Religious and political views are particularly sensitive, because people often depend on these for a sense of identity and belonging. Sometimes the conflict is caused by a religious/political group being attacked; sometimes it is because the group is eager to spread a particular belief and even enforce it on others. Some leaders may aggravate religious and political differences as part of their tactics for keeping or gaining power.
4. In the same way ethnic differences can cause conflict, or be made to cause it. Again, people's ethnicity gives them a sense of identity and belonging, and it is threats to this sense which can cause violent responses, just as individuals may lash out with angry words or gestures when they feel threatened. Indeed, conflicts of all kinds most frequently arise when people feel threatened - regardless of whether the threat is real. It is harder to soothe and reassure people when they are frightened or angry.
Root causes of conflict
Human beings have basic needs. Everyone needs to be recognised as an individual with a personal identity; everyone needs to be able to feel safe. If these needs aren't met, people protest, and protesting can lead to rebellion and violence. Many people find their identity and security in their cultural group and its particular point of view so clashes between different cultural groups also lead to disputes that can easily turn into violent. Adekanye (2003:13-17) posited that the root causes of conflicts in Africa can be categorized into what he calls “background and structural cum predisposition conditions,” “precipitant”, “accelerators or triggers”. The “structural cum predisposition conditions’ he states “encompasses (among others) such things as the colonially imposed, artificial boundaries, the configuration of given society including the differences between groups as regards language, culture, religion, class and social organization. Nwolise (2003:41) and Diallo (1986:15-16) found that the introduction of slavery and the inroads of colonialism into Africa that traditional societies began to disintegrate, causing the code of honour to fall into disuse in war. Nwolise (2003:41 – 422) posited that four intervening destructive pathogens that changed the characters, chemistry and nature of Africa’s conflict- prevention, management and resolution are: slavery, colonialism, foreign religion and emergence of a new concept of state. He summarily gives a catalogue of other factors to include: unclear national boundaries, foreign instigation from former colonial masters, petroleum discoveries near borders, ideological disputation (Capitalism vs. Communism), ‘Cold War’ vagaries, religious fanaticism, and oppositions to dictatorship, racism, military rule, inter-ethnic power struggles and others as shown by Osaghae (1998) and Jinadu (2003).
Cold War
One major cause of violent conflicts in Africa was the ‘Cold War” while it lasted. The West –East unhealthy hegemonic rivalry, patterned in much semblance to the colonial scramble for and partition of Africa, which culminated in the Berlin Conference of 1884, further deepened escalation of violent conflicts in Africa. The West –U.S.A. and the European allies and the East-the U.S.S.R. had their different spheres of control in Africa. Rogge (1987) posited that conditions in the Horn of Africa continued to deteriorate especially in the 1980s at the instance of conflicting external influences: the USA, USSR, Saudi Arabia and Libya. These external actors added to the internal political complexities of the region he asserts. Pan-Africanists and nationalist leaders, like Nkrumah in Ghana, Sekou Toure in Guinea and Lumumba in Congo, sought to counterbalance the designs of the West by turning towards thee Soviet Union. A system of client state then emerged, in which African governments were maintained in power in return for their allegiance to one of the superpowers. In countries such as Somalia, Zaire and Sierra Leone corrupt leaderships were proposed up and sustained in power while the institutional basis of the state atrophied. Arms flows and military expenditure increased dramatically with the dire economic and social consequences. Sequel to the end of the “Cold War” in 1989, there occurred the phenomenon of ‘surplus arms’ in the international arms market. What followed was the proliferation of small arms and weapons it the African continent. The arms in the armoury of the East block-Russia, consequent upon the disintegration of the latter started diffusing out across the globe. One of the major markets for thee arms was the continent of Africa. The reason being that most conflicts that were hitherto being suppressed during ‘Cold War’ era had started finding conducive atmosphere for escalation and new ones had a clear coast for manifestation. This accounted for the unprecedented wave of conflict that started blowing across Africa since the late 1980s till date. Department for International Development (DFID) Framework Document entitled “The causes of Conflict in the Sub-Saharan Africa” found that the scale of state-to-state arms transfers during the Cold War was colossal. In 1988 alone, at the end of the Cold War, they amounted to more than $4billion. By 1995, DFID, (2001:6-7) found that they had dropped to $270 million. However, state to state flows were replaced by a major growth in commercial arms dealing and illegal arms trafficking in low maintenance light weaponry, primarily items such as the AK 47 rifle and rocket propelled granade launchers. The document further claims that: “Both sides in the Cold War contributed to promoting or exacerbating conflict in Africa throughout the 1960s, 70s and 80s. Much of the present conflict on the continent is, in part, a legacy of Cold War policies of both East and West. During this era, questions of principles like good governance, the rule of law and transparent, equitable economic management, were often overlooked in the interests of political pragmatism and commercial gain.” Adekanye (1996) posited that the Toyota funded Disarming Ethnic Guerrillas (DEG) programme covering South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Uganda establishes that post Apartheid South Africa, and
indeed the whole of Africa, is awash with arms. He further explains that based on his practical experience during disarmament activities carried out in the countries mentioned above, that each of the guerrilla had up to four weapons with them but at the point of disarmament they all always surrendered one, keeping the rest in a safe place so that at the slightest provocation war can resume again. This practice puts the society at the risk of what has technically been referred to as the phenomenon of “return wars’”.
Structural Violence
The issue of structural violence also loom large as a cause of violent conflicts in Africa. Galtung (1985) posited that structural violence threatens needs for welfare and identity. But more succinctly put, structural violence is the instructionalised framework or predetermined
long-term arrangement targeted at putting limitation to the efforts of an actor/entity at performing to the fullest of its potentials in any undertaking. The structural violence originates from the Western World against Africa. International financial institutions such as International
Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank, and Paris Club etc. are the executors of these obnoxious projects. Since the mid-1980s Africa has been faced with a debt crisis, the overhang of which has persisted into the 1990s. It all started years back in the 1970s when African governments resorted to heavy borrowing in order to sustain their imports and investment needs, only to be further
burdened by a combination of rising interest rates, worsening terms of trade and mismanagement of shrinking foreign exchange earnings. Total debt stocks for Africa amounted to a little over $US 109 billion in 1980, by 1990 these had increased by as much as 150percent to $US272.7
billion. Adekanye (1998) posited that Debt stocks for the continent in 1995 were an estimated staggering $US 313 billion. Under this burden of debts, African governments were enjoined by these international financial institutions mentioned above to embark on Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and a host of other austerity measures which include: trade liberation; currency devaluation; tight control of money supply; cutbacks in social expenditures, particularly
education, health and housing; removal of food subsidies; reduction in public employment; and privatization of state- owned enterprises. In short, “market forces” regulate all matters relating to prices, incomes and productivity. This has been the grand net into which African countries have fallen headlong, and it has been having ripple effects in all spheres of their national lives.
Environmental and Demographic Insecurity
Another cause of violent conflicts in Africa is stresses from environmental and demographic insecurity. Most African countries bordering the sahara region and through the Horn have been facing problems of droughts and unprecedented desertification over the last two to three decades. Among the hardest hit are: Mauritania, northern parts of Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. The deterioration of land as the natural resource base resulting form demographic pressure and chronic poverty has meant that the little available land has become subject of intense disputes and life-and-death struggles, as the case in the Senegal River basin.
Democratization
Pressure of democratization is another conflict sources in Africa. Many contemporary African states have suffered under authoritarian, corrupt, self-perpetuating oligarchies and one-person rulerships and this has brought them under intense pressures from both domestic social forces
and external donor interests to democratize. The pattern across Africa has always been mobilization of ethnic identities, religious affiliations or other social affinities for electoral competition in which the interests of the ethnic minority, religious or other social minority groups become jeopardized. This always leaves much to be desired and more often than
not, it results in bloody violent conflicts.
Loss of State Capacities
Adekanye (1998) found that increasing loss of state capacities as a major cause of conflict in Africa. He describes most African states as experiencing regime breakdown, state collapse or others, failed states. He maintains this position as a result of failure on the part of many of the states to carry out the basic functions of a state. These include: creating (and maintaining) public order, organizing (and controlling) the military; running a government; administering the machinery of state; dispensing justice; managing conflicts among groups and individuals living in the territory; promoting the general welfare; increasing the national wealth (along with development); reducing inequalities; regulating external relations; and conducting war and peace.
Instability in the Niger Delta region
The instability in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has been manifested in the violent political, economic and social conflicts. Studies into causes of protracted social conflicts have shown that conflicts most often occur when basic human needs, such as the need for physical security and well-being; communal or cultural recognition, participation, and control; and distributive justice are repeatedly denied, threatened, or frustrated, especially over long periods of time. Noticeably, many contemporary conflicts are the current manifestation of a cycle of historical grievance. Although led by modern political entrepreneurs, who are also articulating modern grievances, their intensity is related to deep-rooted beliefs in a separate identity that were never completely extinguished by state policies of repression, eradication, or homogenisation. The severe political and economic discrimination in the Niger Delta have left a durable legacy of reverberating echoes of conflict. The oil boom brought great wealth but greater corruption; divisions between rich and poor are growing; and subsistence practices are getting weaker. The despoliation of their environment and the resultant conflicts has their roots in the discovery, exploration and exploitation of oil by the multinationals. Today, oil accounts for about 90 per cent of Nigerian exports and more than 80 per cent of government revenue. The Niger Delta being the ‘goose that lays the golden eggs’ has nothing to show for this precious gift of creation. Consequently, demands for more equitable distribution of the oil-based wealth and the observance of sustainable business practices with due regard to a clean environment is today championed by several groups globally. Particularly threatened is the mangrove forest of Nigeria - the largest in Africa and sixty per cent of which is located in the Niger Delta. Therefore, the Niger Delta’s potential for sustainable development remains unfulfilled and is now increasingly threatened by environmental devastation and worsening economic conditions. The current conflict in the Niger Delta arose in the early 1990s due to tensions between the foreign oil corporations and a number of the Niger Delta's minority ethnic groups who felt they were being exploited, particularly the Ogoni and the Ijaw. Ethnic and political unrest has continued throughout the 1990s and persists as of 2007 despite the conversion to democracy and the election of the Obasanjo government in 1999. Competition for oil wealth has fueled violence between innumerable ethnic groups, causing the militarization of nearly the entire region by ethnic militia groups as well as Nigerian military and police forces (notably the Nigerian Mobile Police). Victims of crimes are fearful of seeking justice for crimes committed against them because of growing "impunity from prosecution for individuals responsible for serious human rights abuses, which has created a devastating cycle of increasing conflict and violence The regional and ethnic conflicts are so numerous that fully detailing each is impossible and impractical.
The conflict is today being made more complex and worse by the several goal-post shifting activities of the parties involved. The government continues to marginalize the people, militarising the area, and maiming and killing countless number of the locals. The locals have now resorted to hostage taking, hijacking and kidnapping of expatriate oil company workers and demand of ransom, and repeated invasion and blockading of oil installations. The companies are determined to continue in business by aligning with the government and adopting ‘divide and rule tactics’ leading to many communal and ethnic crises in the region. The complexity of the conflict has grown today with the revelation of the involvement of top government security personnel and their domestic and foreign secret business associates in bunkering practices along the coasts.
Internal violence and genocide
Research has shown that democracies have less internal systematic violence. For instance, one study finds that the most democratic and the most authoritarian states have few civil wars, and intermediate regimes the most. The probability for a civil war is also increased by political change, regardless whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy. Intermediate regimes continue to be the most prone to civil war, regardless of the time since the political change. In the long run, since intermediate regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end-point of the process of democratization (Hegre et al. 2001). Abadie (2004) found that the most democratic nations have the least terrorism. Harff (2003) posited that genocide and politicide are rare in democracies. Rummel (1997) posited that the more democratic a regime, the less its democide. He found that democide has killed six times as many people as battles. Davenport and Armstrong (2004) found that democratic political systems have decrease political bans, censorship, torture, disappearances and mass killing, doing so in a linear fashion across diverse measurements, methodologies, time periods, countries, and contexts." It concludes: "Across measures and methodological techniques, it is found that below a certain level, democracy has no impact on human rights violations, but above this level democracy influences repression in a negative and roughly linear manner." Davenport and Armstrong (2003) found that thirty years worth of statistical research has revealed that only two variables decrease human rights violations: political democracy and economic development. There is a need now, more than ever to reorder priorities and to seek better understanding of the underlying causes and dynamics of the crisis with an aim to provide effective conflict prevention and management strategies.
CASE OF OGONI LAND (1992-1995)
Ogoniland is a 404-square-mile (1,050 km2) region in the southeast of the Niger Delta basin. Economically viable oil was discovered in Ogoniland in 1957, just one year after the discovery of Nigeria's first commercial petroleum deposit, with Shell and Chevron setting up shop throughout the next two decades. The Ogonis, a minority ethnic group of about half a million people who call Ogoniland home, and other ethnic groups in the region attest that during this time, the government began forcing them to abandon their land to oil companies without consultation, and offering negligible compensation. This is further supported by a 1979 constitutional addition which afforded the federal government full ownership and rights to all Nigerian territory and also decided that all compensation for land would "be based on the value of the crops on the land at the time of its acquisition, not on the value of the land itself." The Nigerian government could now distribute the land to oil companies as it deemed fit. The 1970s and 1980s saw the government's empty promises of benefits for the Niger Delta peoples fall through, with the Ogoni growing increasing dissatisfied and their environmental, social, and economic apparatus rapidly deteriorating the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was formed in 1992. MOSOP, spearheaded by Ogoni playwright and author Ken Saro-Wiwa, became the major campaigning organization representing the Ogoni people in their struggle for ethnic and environmental rights. Its primary targets, and at times adversaries, have been the Nigerian government and the oil company Royal Dutch Shell. Ogoni Flag created by Ken Saro-Wiwa Beginning in December 1992, the conflict between Ogonis and the oil infrastructure escalated to a level of greater seriousness and intensity on both sides. Both parties began carrying out acts of violence and MOSOP issued an ultimatum to the oil companies (Shell, Chevron, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) which demanded some $10 billion in accumulated royalties, damages and compensation, and "immediate stoppage of environmental degradation", and negotiations for mutual agreement on all future drilling. The Ogonis threatened to embark on mass action to disrupt their operation if the companies failed to comply. By this act, the Ogoni shifted the focus of their actions from an unresponsive federal government to the oil companies engaged in their own region. The rationale for this assignment of responsibility were the benefits accrued by the oil companies from extracting the natural wealth of the Ogoni homeland, and neglect from central government.The government responded by banning public gatherings and declaring that disturbances of oil production were acts of treason. Oil extraction from the territory had slowed to a trickle of 10,000 barrels per day (1,600 m³/d) (.5% of the national total). However, because the withdrawal was a temporary security measure, it provided the government with a compelling reason to 'restore order.Military repression escalated in May 1994. On May 21, soldiers and mobile policemen appeared in most Ogoni villages. On that day, four Ogoni chiefs (all on the conservative side of a schism within MOSOP over strategy) were brutally murdered. Saro-Wiwa, head of the opposing faction, had been denied entry to Ogoniland on the day of the murders, but he was detained in connection with the killings. The occupying forces, led by Major Paul Okuntimo of Rivers State Internal Security, claimed to be 'searching for those directly responsible for the killings of the four Ogonis.' However, witnesses say that they engaged in terror operations against the general Ogoni population. Amnesty International characterized the policy as deliberate terrorism. By mid-June, 30 villages had been completely destroyed, 600 people had been detained, and at least 40 had been killed. An eventual total of around 100,000 internal refugees and an estimated 2,000 civilian deaths was recorded. In May 1994, nine activists from the movement who would become known as 'The Ogoni Nine', among them Ken Saro-Wiwa, were arrested and accused of incitement to murder following the deaths of four Ogoni elders. Saro-Wiwa and his comrades denied the charges, but were imprisoned for over a year before being found guilty and sentenced to death by a specially convened tribunal, hand-selected by General Sani Abacha, on 10 November 1995. The activists were denied due process and upon being found guilty, were executed via hanging by the Nigerian state. The executions were met with an immediate international response. The trial was widely criticised by human rights organisations and the governments of other states, who condemned the Nigerian government's long history of detaining their critics, mainly pro-democracy and other political activists. The Commonwealth of Nations, which had also plead for clemency, suspended Nigeria's membership in response. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU all implemented sanctions, however, none of these had an impact on oil production.Shell asked the Nigerian government for clemency towards those found guilty, but its request was refused. However, a 2001 Greenpeace report found that "two witnesses that accused them [Saro-Wiwa and the other activists] later admitted that Shell and the military had bribed them with promises of money and jobs at Shell. Shell admitted having given money to the Nigerian military, who brutally tried to silence the voices which claimed justice. As of 2006, the situation in Ogoniland has eased significantly, progressed by the transition to democratic rule in 1999. However, no attempts have been made by the government or an international body to bring about justice by investigating and prosecuting those involved in the violence and property destruction that have occurred in Ogoniland, although a class action lawsuit has been brought against Shell by individual plaintiffs.
Ijaw-Itsekiri conflicts (1997)
The late 1990s saw an increase in the number and severity of clashes between militants of the Ijaw ethnic group, the largest in the entire Delta region with a population of over 7 million, and those of Itsekiri origin whose number is only about 450,000. The conflict between the two groups has been particularly intense in the major town of Warri. While the Ijaw and the Itsekiri have lived alongside each other for centuries, for the most part harmoniously, the Itsekiri were first to make contact with European traders, as early as the 16th century, and they were more aggressive both in seeking Western education and in using the knowledge acquired to press their commercial advantages; until the arrival of Sir George Goldie's National Africa Company (later renamed the Royal Niger Company) in 1879, Itsekiri chieftains monopolized trade with Europeans in the Western Niger region. Despite the loss of their monopoly, the advantages already held by the Itsekiri ensured that they continued to enjoy a superior position to that held by the Ijaw, breeding in the latter a sense of resentment at what they felt to be colonial favoritism towards the Itsekiri.The departure of the British at independence did not lead, as might have been expected, to a decrease in tensions between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri. With the discovery of large oil reserves in the Niger Delta region in the late 1950s, a new bone of contention was introduced, as the ability to claim ownership of a given piece of land now promised to yield immense benefits in terms of jobs and infrastructural benefits to be provided by the oil companies. Despite this new factor, rivalry between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri did not actually escalate to the level of violent conflict between the two groups until the late 1990s, when the death of General Sani Abacha in 1997 led to a re-emergence of local politics. The issue of local government ward allocation has proven particularly contentious, as the Ijaw feel that the way in which wards have been allocated ensures that their superior numbers will not be reflected in the number of wards controlled by politicians of Ijaw ethnicity. Control of the city of Warri, the largest metropolitan area in Delta State and therefore a prime source of political patronage, has been an especially fiercely contested prize. This has given birth to heated disputes between the Ijaw, the Itsekiri and the Urhobo about which of the three groups are "truly" indigenous to the Warri region, with the underlying presumption being that the "real" indigenes should have control of the levers of power, regardless of the fact that all three groups enjoy ostensibly equal political rights in their places of residence. The December 1998 All Ijaw Youths Conference crystallized the Ijaws' struggle for petroleum resource control with the formation of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the issuing of the Kaiama Declaration. In it, long-held Ijaw concerns about the loss of control of their homeland and their own lives to the oil companies were joined with a commitment to direct action. In the declaration, and in a letter to the companies, the Ijaws called for oil companies to suspend operations and withdraw from Ijaw territory. The IYC pledged “to struggle peacefully for freedom, self-determination and ecological justice,” and prepared a campaign of celebration, prayer, and direct action 'Operation Climate Change' beginning December 28. In December 1998, two warships and 10-15,000 Nigerian troops occupied Bayelsa and Delta states as the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) mobilized for Operation Climate Change. Soldiers entering the Bayelsa state capital of Yenagoa announced they had come to attack the youths trying to stop the oil companies. On the morning of December 30, two thousand young people processed through Yenagoa, dressed in black, singing and dancing. Soldiers opened fire with rifles, machine guns, and tear gas, killing at least three protesters and arresting twenty-five more. After a march demanding the release of those detained was turned back by soldiers, three more protesters were shot dead including Nwashuku Okeri and Ghadafi Ezeifile. The military declared a state of emergency throughout Bayelsa state, imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and banned meetings. At military roadblocks, local residents were severely beaten or detained. At night, soldiers invaded private homes, terrorizing residents with beatings and women and girls with rape. On January 4, 1999 about one hundred soldiers from the military base at Chevron’s Escravos facility attacked Opia and Ikiyan, two Ijaw communities in Delta State. Bright Pablogba, the traditional leader of Ikiyan, who came to the river to negotiate with the soldiers, was shot along with a seven-year-old girl and possibly dozens of others. Of the approximately 1,000 people living in the two villages, four people were found dead and sixty-two were still missing months after the attack. The same soldiers set the villages ablaze, destroyed canoes and fishing equipment, killed livestock, and destroyed churches and religious shrines. Nonetheless, Operation Climate Change continued, and disrupted Nigerian oil supplies through much of 1999 by turning off valves through Ijaw territory. In the context of high conflict between the Ijaw and the Nigerian Federal Government (and its police and army), the military carried out the Odi massacre, killing scores if not hundreds of Ijaws. The world today is full of contradictions we might say but Albert Einstein did posit that "the world we have created is a product of our thinking; it cannot be changed without changing our thinking". There lies the test of our collective appreciation of the dynamics of this multidimensional and complex crisis. Peace in the Niger Delta can be an end or a means to an end. Peace is not a static concept particularly when the status quo entrenches continuing inequities, injustices and tyranny. Peace is much more than the absence of war. We are all not unaware that we live in a world of unprecedented wealth and opportunity but one in which gross inequities and imbalances continue to deprive major portions of the world’s population of the benefits which our technological civilization now makes possible. The fact that we have at the same time greater concentrations of wealth than ever and more poor and deprived is also an unsustainable paradox, which challenges the moral basis of our civilization. It is becoming painfully obvious for instance, that the gulf between the beneficiaries and the victims of globalisation is growing. Redressing the gross imbalances and inequities are quintessential to sustained and sustainable peace and the primary challenge for the 21st Century. At the same time we must be realistic. The process of change, which this involves, is itself a source of tension and potential conflict. Prevention of conflicts and maintenance of peace is therefore largely a matter of learning to manage the processes of dynamic change required to enable all to have access to the benefits that the globalisation of our economies has made possible. This is why the goal of achieving and maintaining peace and security must be pursued along the pathway to development which is sustainable in economic, environmental, social and human terms, and which redresses the imbalances and inequities from which conflicts arise. Along the pathway to peace, continuing conflicts will inevitably arise and many lessons are to be learnt from the collective experiences which can help produce better and more effective means of preventing and resolving future conflicts. This is the case in the Niger Delta today where the human costs of conflict are immense and the wounds they inflict on the attitudes of people, and their relationships with one another, heal much more slowly than their physical wounds. There is need to lay emphasis on developing a culture of peace, which will entrench within the societies the values, the attitudes, and the bonds of common interests which will transcend the differences from which conflicts arise.
The emergence of armed groups in the Delta region (2003-2009)
The Niger Delta community in Nigeria is seen in the violent turn of events with the emergence of the militant group since the late 1990s and in March 1997 the first major flare-up occurred in Warri following the decision by military authorities to relocate a local government headquarters from the Ijaw town of Ogbe-Ijaw to the Itsekiri community of Ogidigben and in that showdown hundreds were reported to have been killed on either side during three months of fighting. Six Shell flow stations were seized by militant groups and 127 Shell staff were held hostage
The youth movement which metamorphed into an armed militia called for the immediate withdrawal from Ijawland of all military forces belonging to the federal government. It further declared that any oil company that employed the services of the federal armed forces to protect its operations will be viewed as an enemy of the Ijaw people. Again in May and June 1999, ethnic Ijaw and Itsekiri militias engaged in fighting in Delta State, leaving over 200 dead. Further in May 2003, there was serious outbreak of inter-ethnic violence involving Ijaw, Itsekiri Urhobo and Nigerian security forces again in Delta State, leaving hundreds dead and thousands homeless. About 40 percent of the country’s oil industry was shut down for some weeks. Chevron in particular reportedly suffered over $500 million in infrastructure damage in addition to significant oil production losses. In November 1999, Odi Community was attacked by Nigerian security forces and hundred of people were killed. Beyond 2003, the crisis entered an amorphous phase with the formation of several splinter groups resulting in the formation of a plethora of militia camps across the Niger Delta by various individuals, which some were previously unknown. Currently,listed below are the various militant groups in Niger Delta region of Nigeria:
The Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF)
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)
The Coalition of Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA)
The Niger Delta people’s Salvation Front (NDSF)
The joint Revolutionary Council
On 27 September 2004, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Mujaheed Asari Dokubo declared an “all-out war” against the Federal Government. There are varying accounts of the remote and immediate causes of this turn of events but with this announcement the world oil market was jolted and crude oil price moved beyond the $50 a barrel mark for the first time. Other militia camps have since engaged in various disruptive acts aimed primarily at the industry. Oil company staff and sometimes their dependants have been kidnapped at random.
Challenges of sustainable peace
Since the basis of conflict is the clash of interests, values and goals, conflicts can only be resolved when these are changed. Preventing and mitigating the impact of internal violent conflicts are not sufficient to achieve peace and stability in today’s interdependent world. The upholding of human rights, pursuing inclusive and equitable development and respecting human dignity and diversity are very important. Equally decisive is to develop the capability of individuals and communities to make informed choices and act on their own behalf. In many respects, "human security requires including the excluded." It focuses on the widest possible range of people having enough confidence in their future- enough that they can actually think about creating genuine possibilities for people to live in safety and decency. Seen from this perspective, human security reinforces state security but does not replace it. Ensuring genuine peace that would bring solace and self-actualisation to the people of the Niger Delta without mortgaging the comfort and pleasure of the unborn generations seem a great task. A sustainable system naturally, is one that does not harm the environment or a system that can continue or be continued for a long time. Therefore, the peace that we pursue in the Niger Delta should be an enduring one. Many do not believe in this idea being realisable in the Niger Delta, but whether achievable or not, we should note that the principle behind sustainability is to make life meaningful to all. It all depends on our perceptions and sincere feelings as regards our collective responsibilities toward lasting peace in this region.
Mistakes and Lost opportunities
cases of fatalities have been recorded. Missed Opportunities at resolving the Niger Delta problem While being very mindful of our role at this moment of our national history, we believe there have been several missed opportunities that would have helped in writing our history differently. We made mistakes and lost opportunities both as a nation and as individuals in the handling of this very sensitive issue as depicted below:
• We made mistake when as a nation we created an inequitable platform for the appropriation of national wealth.
• We lack credibility to set stage for sustainable human development at all levels of governance.
• Still, and Perhaps most disheartening of all, when we failed at the crucial second and third tier levels of governance to deploy the resources ceded to the region for the betterment of the region.
• We lost a golden opportunity to change some of our laws that have been the basis of the agitation in the Niger Delta, when we failed to amend our constitution appropriately in the last eight years. It is estimated that Nigeria has lost an average of 300,000 barrels per day in oil production since 1999 to the state of violence and instability in the Niger Delta region.
This translates to daily production loss of about US$18 million translating to an awesome US$58.3 billion dollars in nine years. Several multinational oil companies have all but moved out of on-shore locations, resulting in heavy revenue losses to businesses, Federal and Niger Delta state governments have lost colossal revenues to this lingering crisis. To put it mildly, the human cost and the damage to local economies of the region has been mind boggling. Militarisation of children and the generational of youth to violence There are approximately six million people under the age of 17 in the Niger Delta States who are directly experiencing a prolonged period of concentrated civil disturbance in the most critical formative stages of their lives. The politicisation of children and their consequent exposure to violence and the means of violence have been intense in this region and is central to the menace of cultism. Experience has shown that cultism is the nursery ground for militancy in the region. We are consequently at risk of losing a generation of youths to mindless violence if we have not already lost them. Our nation is at a crossroad, breeding a culture of violence that is fast spreading out of the region to other parts of the country.
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Common factor in ethnic conflicts in Africa
Economic factors have been identified as one of the major causes of conflict in Africa. Theorists believe that competition for scarce resources is a common factor in almost all ethnic conflicts in Africa. In multi-ethnic societies like Nigeria and South Africa, ethnic communities violently compete for property, rights, jobs, education, language, social amenities and good health care facilities. In his study, Okwudiba and Nnoli (1980) found that socio-economic factors are linked to ethnic conflict in Nigeria. Furnival and Nnoli (1980:72-3) posited that the working of economic forces makes for tension between groups with competing interests. In the case of South Africa, Gerhard Mare posited that ethnicity and ethnic conflict appear to be a response to the uneven development in South Africa, which caused ethnic groups (Xhosas, Zulus and even Afrikaners) to mobilise to compete for resources along ethnic lines. It follows that multi-ethnic countries are likely to experience distributional conflicts. Another common factor of ethnic conflict is psychology, especially the fear and insecurity of ethnic groups during transition. It has been opined that extremists build upon these fears to polarise the society. Additionally, memories of past traumas magnify these anxieties. These interactions produce a toxic brew of distrust and suspicion that leads to ethnic violence. The fear of white Afrikaners in South Africa on the eve of democratic elections was a good case in point. Gurr's (1970) posited that relative deprivation theory offers an explanation based on an ethnic groups' access to power and economic resources. Horowitz, (1985) posited that group worth is based on the results of economic and political competitions. Lake and Rothschild,(1996) found that ethnic conflict is a sign of a weak state or a state embroiled in ancient loyalties. In this case, states act with bias to favour a particular ethnic group or region, and behaviours such as preferential treatment fuel ethnic conflicts. Therefore, in critical or difficult political situations, the effectiveness of governance is dependent on its ability to address social issues and human needs. Recently, scholars have come out with different approaches to conceptualising ethnicity. Faced with the proliferation of separatist conflicts in North America, the inadequacies underlying modernisation theory are being exposed. The notion that modernity would result in smooth transition from gemeinschaf (community) to gessellschaft (association), with gradual dissolution of ethnic affiliations, simply did not work. Ethnicity has persisted in North America, Africa and elsewhere. This failure simply means ethnicity will remain, and that the stability of African states is threatened not by ethnicity per se, but the failure of national institutions to recognise and accommodate ethnic differences and interests. According to this argument, the lesson for ethnic conflict management is that governments should not discriminate against groups or they will create conflict.
The second theory is from the primordial school and stresses the uniqueness and the overriding importance of ethnic identity. Geertz, (1963) posited that ethnicity is a biological and fixed characteristic of individuals and communities. The third theoretical approach is the Instrumentalist argument. Barth et al (1969) found that in Africa where poverty and deprivation are becoming endemic, mostly as a result of distributive injustice, ethnicity remains an effective means of survival and mobilization. Ethnic groups that form for economic reasons, easily disband after achieving their objectives. Benedict,(1991) posited that ethnicity is "a construct" rather than a constant. Additionally, scholars' attention has also shifted to the nature of ethnic conflict and violence because the post Cold War era has been marked by the resurgence of ethnic conflict and even genocide in some societies like Rwanda, Bosnia, and Zaire. Burton's (1979) posited that ethnic groups fight because they are denied not only their biological needs, but also psychological needs that relate to growth and development. These include peoples' need for identity, security, recognition, participation, and autonomy. This theory provides a plausible explanation of ethnic conflicts in Africa, where such needs are not easily met by undemocratic regimes. Burton (1979) posited that the problem of ethnicity in Africa largely depends on the level of state effectiveness, accountability, and transparency in handling the demands of diversity and not aggressive nature of human beings. It is necessary to emphasize that proper analysis of ethnic conflicts is very important in order to avoid prescribing a wrong medicine for the ailment. Failure to find solutions to Africa's ethnic problem will have devastating social and economic consequences on a continent that is already worn out by conflict, poverty and disease. According to theorists, conflict management means constructive handling of differences. It is an art of designing appropriate institutions to guide inevitable conflict into peaceful channels. The importance of conflict management cannot be overemphasised. It is when leaders and states fail to address important issues and basic needs that violence brews. Nowhere is conflict management and peaceful resolution of conflict more important than in Africa. African leaders should take a second look at their behaviour and policy choices. Emphasis here should be on discouraging corruption, embracing transparency and good governance.
Ethnic conflicts in Africa: A case study of Nigeria and South Africa
There are obvious reasons for chosen Nigeria and South Africa as case studies. Though countries apart, they are regional giants. They wield great economic, political and military power in sub-Saharan Africa. The two countries are equally blessed with a mosaic of ethnicities and races, an asset to national and economic development. In the case of South Africa, the country's over 40 million people have long been polarized along racial lines. The country is made up of whites, indigenous Africans, coloreds, and Indians. The blacks form the majority of the population with about 30 million people, the whites 5 million, and the coloreds and Indians share 3 million. In South Africa, class is determined by race, with blacks at the bottom of the ladder. In the past, indigenous Africans were forced to live in impoverished and segregated ethnic "homelands" under the apartheid regime. The country has about 11 linguistic groups, but English is the official language. With about 140 million people, Nigeria is Africa's most populous country. It is home to 250 linguistic groups, but English is also Nigeria's chosen official language. Although most of the ethnic groups are very tiny, three ethnic groups constitute somewhere between 60 and 70 percent of the population. The Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups count for 30 percent of the population, the Yorubas about 20 per cent and the Igbos about 18 percent. These three major ethnic groups are differentiated not only by region, but also by religion and life-style.
Nigeria and South Africa are both stratified societies. However, only in South Africa was the white race dominant over the African majority. As we shall discover from this study, institutionalized racism, discrimination, language, history and culture reinforced the distance between South Africa and Nigeria. Both countries were shaped by assumptions and definitions imposed by the British rulers. British imperial rule in both countries provided identities, languages and symbols for ethnic and racial groups. Colonial racism was responsible for creating ethnic divisions and encouraging regionalism and separatism, which further separated the races and ethnic groups. In South Africa, for example, the colonists' policies deepened the differences between Zulus and Xhosas, Ndebele and Vendas, Tswana and Qwaqwa, etc. (Horowitz, 1985; Mare, Gerhard, 1993) found that those of mixed race were segregated from the white groups through culture, residence, occupation and status. These differences benefited the elite by fomenting conflict.The case of Nigeria is similar, with the exception of the racial groupings. There are no significant populations of colored people or whites in Nigeria. Instead, there are indigenous ethnic groups who were encouraged to segregate by the colonialists. The divide-and-rule strategy was evident in the design that distanced ethnic groups from each other in separate areas called "Sabongari", in northern Nigeria and "Abakpa" in the eastern part of the country. This arrangement resulted in violent conflict when the various ethnic groups were forced to compete for scarce resources. In both countries, the process of modernization is adding tension to already divided societies. As in most of the third world countries, major rifts in society such as these present formidable problems for governments attempting to maintain or establish ethnic harmony and foster economic development. The South African conflict involved the Zulus and the Xhosas, African National Congress supporters in the KwaZulu-Natal homeland. Few physical conflicts occurred between the dominant minority white groups and the black majority ethnic groups. This was partly because of the government strategy of segregation, which distanced black homelands from white cities. However, there was a high level of violent conflict between black ethnic groups in the homelands. In Natal alone, The New York Times, 18 November 1992: A6 reported that well-over 1,147 people were killed during the first months of 1992. The conflict in Nigeria, especially from the year 1967 to 1970, was somewhat different from that in South Africa. In Nigeria, ethnic identities are so mixed that no region or state is immune to the infection. The main conflicts involved Hausa-Fulani and the Eastern Ibos and the Yoruba and Hausa, the minorities of the oil producing states of the south. Both Nigeria and South Africa are among the richest in the continent in terms of natural resources. Nigeria can boast of its oil, coal, tin, bauxite and gold. South Africa is rich in gold, diamonds and other strategic minerals. Unfortunately, the majority of South Africans did not benefit from these riches because of racism and apartheid. That however does not rule out the presence of a strong and diversified private business sector and a substantial middle class that does include some blacks. Though South Africa's economy is not very healthy, they still have a highly developed financial system, a fairly efficient telecommunication infrastructure, power, a reliable water supply, roads, and a system of public administration, which is afflicted by patronage and corruption, but still delivering to the citizens.
In Nigeria, the majority of the population, especially the people from the Niger Delta oil-producing areas in the South, has yet to feel the impact of oil revenues because of corruption, discrimination and economic mismanagement. After independence, the Nigerian government interfered heavily in all spheres of economic life at great cost to the private sector and economic growth in general. Additionally, ethnicity, centralized government, and a corrupt ruling elite overshadow life in Nigeria. The incessant power failures in Nigerian cities and lack of good drinking water, telecommunication systems and reliable roads are complicating life in Africa's most populous and wealthy nation. Hence the questions, where is Nigeria's oil income? Where is Nigerian leadership? Both Nigeria and South Africa, having concluded a difficult transition to democratic rule are at a crossroads. Both countries bear the responsibility to steer the continent away from the repression of authoritarian governments towards a path of social and economic development and good governance. Interestingly, the two countries are also driven by a similar political strategies to manage conflict through national reconciliation, consensus building and economic development. The dual processes of transition and transformation need nothing less than a vibrant economy in which the basic needs of citizens are taken care of. They also require a state and society with a sense of shared destiny where racial and ethnic identities are harnessed positively as a uniting force rather than divisive factor or an impediment to nation building. In South Africa, the potential for disaster may have been averted by the wisdom of Nelson Mandela. However, what will become of current president Thabo Mbeki's government is still unknown. Now, all eyes are on Nigeria's president, Olusegun Obasanjo, and his party to show some degree of capability too. In South Africa's transition process, Mandela's charisma helped the African national Congress (ANC) to pursue the path of negotiation, accommodation and confidence building for managing the ethnic diversity problem, though some South African whites still complain of dominant party favoritism following ANC's second election victory of 1999. However, in Nigeria the ruling People’s Democratic Party's (PDP) shortcomings are evident in Nigeria's democratic transition process. The South African people defied the pattern of their past and broke all the rules of social theory to forge a powerful spirit of unity from a shattered nation. Waldmeir and Holman,(1994) found that in Nigeria, the politicians are still putting out the growing flames of ethnic conflicts and religious violence. This is partly due to the government's lack of will and partly due to the military, which has been a stumbling block in the transition to democracy for some time. Nigeria's dictators often dressed in ethnic costumes and exploited the opportunism of the politicians and thus were able to use ethnicity to manipulate the transition process and silence their opponents. The human right groups that fought against General Babangida's and Abacha's regimes were not prepared for electoral politics. Hence, Nigeria marches towards democratization with a feeble civil society, fearing future military takeovers. Comparatively, civil society in South Africa is believed to be far more supportive of democracy than in Nigeria. The South African society accommodates non-governmental organizations, civil associations, and human rights groups. They play a very important role linking the formal bureaucratic activities with the interests of the people. Contrastingly, what has emerged in Nigeria during the transition period are militant ethnic associations, like the Oodua Peoples Movement for the Yorubas, the Arewa Group for the Hausa-Fulanis, and the Movement For Actualisation of Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSOB) for the Igbos. Unlike a genuine civil society, these militant organizations act like political thugs, rarely supportive of democratic principles.
Colonial histories of Nigeria and South Africa
Nigeria and South Africa both have disturbing histories of colonialism and white repression, which generated hatred and conflict among different ethnic groups. The task of addressing these seeds of conflict planted by the British has been a complex one. After weakening the African kingdoms and reordering societies, the colonial powers failed in nation building and providing for the people's basic needs. Hence, poverty increased and with it, conflict over scarce resources. South Africa became a United Republic in 1910. Less than four years later, Nigeria's Southern and Northern protectorates were also being merged into a nation. In South Africa, the creation of the republic followed the 1902 peace agreement reached with the Boers after the gruesome Anglo-Boer War. Meanwhile, the merging of separate colonies into the country of Nigeria was forcefully done without the people's consent. This was a major seed of conflict that is still troubling Nigeria today.
Case 1: Nigeria
The history of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria also traces back to the colonial transgressions that forced the ethnic groups of the northern and southern provinces to become an entity called Nigeria in 1914. Since the various ethnic groups living in these provinces were not consulted regarding the merger, this British colonial policy was autocratic and undemocratic, and thus led to conflict. It denied the people's basic needs of participation, equality and social well-being. An administration that endorses segregation for its people does not have the unity of the country at heart. Rather the separate governments introduced in the North and the South were designed to strengthen the colonial grip on Nigerian society and weaken the people's potentials for resistance. This era of provincial development, though relatively peaceful, also led to growing ethnocentrism. The introduction of "indirect rule" in Nigeria by Lord Fredrick Lugard, the chief administrator, was not the appropriate mechanism for managing tribal animosities in the colony. Nnoli and Okwudiba (1980) posited that the system not only reinforced ethnic divisions, but has complicated the task of welding diverse elements into a Nigerian nation. This strategy of governance distanced ethnic groups from each other. Lugard gave power to the traditional rulers who corruptly used it in the villages to amass wealth, land and establish patronage networks, which, in the long run, encouraged tribalism and nepotism. The segregation of the Nigerian colony was also reinforced by the colonial laws that limited the mobility (Afigbo,1989; Okonjo,1974) posited that Christian Southerners to the Muslim North, created a separate settlement for non-indigenous citizens in the North, and even limited the purchase of land outside one's own region. Prejudice and hatred became rife in the provinces as different ethnic groups started looking at each other suspiciously in all spheres of contact. Unequal and differential treatment of ethnic groups was responsible for the intense competition in Nigerian society. It created disparity in educational achievement and widened the political and economic gaps between northern and southern Nigeria. During this period, there was significant scarcity of all goods, "evident in the economic social and political areas of life. It affected employment, education, political participation and the provision of social services to the population." Nnoli, (1980) posited that the lack of such "basic needs" always gives elites the ability to mobilize groups for intense competition, employing ethnocentrism to achieve their goals. In 1947, a colonial constitution divided Nigeria into three political regions: East, West and North. The North, which was predominately Hausa-Fulani, was the largest and eventually the most populous region. The Igbos dominated the East and Yorubas the West. Osaghae et al (1996) found that with the three major ethnic groups in dominance, the minority groups rebelled and Nigerians started fighting for ethnic dominance as the nation marched towards independence. The creation of the three ethnic regions did not take into account the needs of the ethnic minority groups for autonomy and self-determination. Instead, they were lost within the majority. This development was based on the "bogus theory of regionalism. That one should be loyal to and protect the interest of one's region to the exclusion of the others. Osaghae (1989) posited that the years between 1952 and 1966 brought change in the political culture of the country, transforming the three regions into three political entities. Thus, the struggle for independence was reduced to the quest for ethnic dominance. At this time, ethnic and sub-ethnic loyalties threatened the survival of both East and West, while the North was divided religiously between Christianity and Islam. It was a period of politicised ethnicity and competition for resources, which worsened the relationships between ethnic groups. There was a high degree of corruption, nepotism and tribalism. The national interest was put aside while politicians used public money to build and maintain patronage networks. Since independence, the situation in Nigeria has been fraught with ethnic politics whereby the elite from different ethnic groups schemed to attract as many federal resources to their regions as possible, neglecting issues that could have united the country. The anarchy, competition, and insecurity led to the demise of the first republic. Military intervention culminated in the gruesome ethnic war from 1967 to 1970, when the mistreated Igbos of eastern Nigeria (Biafrans) threatened to secede from the federation. Burton, (1992) posited that the Igbos' grievances were caused by the denial of their basic human needs of equality, citizenship, autonomy and freedom. Wherever such basic needs are denied, conflict often follows as aggrieved groups use violent means to fight for their human rights. While the politicians tried to cope with the colonial legacy that lumped incompatible ethnic groups together into one country, the military elites staged coups, making a mockery of democracy in Africa's most populous and promising country. The corruption, ineptitude and confusion that marked the military era plunged Nigeria into economic problems, poverty, and ethno-religious conflicts until the 1990s. In Nigeria, where politics still follow ethnic lines, there is always disagreement about the rules of the game. The military intervened because they viewed the civilian leaders as inept and indecisive. However, the southerners distrusted the military regime because they felt it was trying to maintain a Hausa-Fulani hegemony in Nigeria. On June 12, 1993, Chief Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba from southwestern Nigeria, won Nigeria's presidential election, but his presidency was annulled by the military regime. In retaliation, southern Nigerians began to form militant organizations to protest unfair treatment and demand a democratically-elected government. During the authoritarian rule of General Sani Abacha, a Muslim from the North, Southerners increasingly feared political marginalization and demanded an end to the Hausa-Fulani domination of the political arena. This development signified the weakness of the government and their lack of effective mechanisms to manage ethnic conflict in Nigeria. Adding to the ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria, was the Yorubas' boycott of the 1994 constitutional conference arranged by General Abacha's regime. The conference was meant to resolve the national debate over ethnicity. Inspired by the pan-Yoruba militant groups, the Afenifere and the Oduduwa People’s Congress (OPC) in southwestern Nigeria threatened secession and intensified violent protests across the country. Ethnic conflicts in Nigeria continued through the democratic transition. Olusegun Obasanjo, a civilian, has been president for several years. However, conflict continues to escalate, as various ethnic groups demand a political restructuring. The federal structure has developed deep cracks and demands urgent action to mend it. But what is most worrisome is the religious dimension of ethnic competition for power and oil wealth in Nigeria. The multiple ethno-religious conflicts in the northern cities of Kano, Kaduna, Jos and Zamfara spring from the introduction of Muslim Sharia courts, and the South's demands for autonomy. The continuing conflict is an indication that Nigeria lacks effective mechanisms to manage ethnic conflicts.
Case 2: South Africa
In South Africa, racism made it impossible for the indigenous Africans to enjoy the fruits of modernization. The white rulers who saw them as only a "thorn in their flesh" constantly discriminated against the Zulus, Xhosas and other black ethnic groups. The period between 1910 and 1947 exposed how economic racism consolidated the structures of white domination and black disenfranchisement and exploitation. This was done through racist legislation against the black majority. These laws forced Africans to evacuate the major cities and move to remote settlements in an impoverished part of the country. In 1912, African elites rebelled by forming the African National Congress (ANC), which was meant to represent and defend black African rights. The black South Africans were deprived of their rights to own land through the enactment of the 1913 Black Land Act. This legislation prevented blacks from producing food for themselves and from making money through agriculture. The government also regulated the job market, reserving skilled work for whites alone and denying black African workers the right to organize and form trade unions. Finally, the Pass Laws prevented blacks from moving freely between the homelands and the cities, thereby paving the ground for the introduction of apartheid. It must be emphasized here that policies of segregation or discrimination foment conflict. But blinded by color, the South African government was oblivious of the future consequences of their choices. The brutal suppression of early black workers' strikes in 1922 indicated that the whites were bent on solidifying the boundary between them and the indigenous Africans. Significant to the history of ethnic conflict in South Africa was the victory of the right-wing racist National Party (NP) in 1948 and the introduction of apartheid. The victory of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party consolidated white interests in the political and economic arena. Leroy,(1989) posited that the NP strengthened the discriminatory laws and championed the belief that Africans were inferior both biologically and culturally to whites and incapable of running their own affairs. The apartheid system served as a divide-and-rule strategy that limited black mobility and participation in socio-economic activities in the country, placing them at a structural disadvantage. Subsequent NP governments did not consider the basic needs of the African population when they created the homelands under the pretext of preserving national authority. Mzala, (1988) posited that the separate administration plan for the homelands was aimed at detribalization within the colonial framework of South Africa. It was an attempt to exclude the black majority from having a role in the administration of their own country." (Ivan Evans.1997) found that the homelands or "Bantustans" were designed to distance the Africans from the fruits of economic development in the country and made them sources of cheap labor for white owned industries. (David Chanaiwa, 1993) found that these Bantustans like KwaZulu-Natal, KwaNdebele, Bophuthatswana, and Lebowa where mainly characterized by poverty, overpopulation, underdevelopment and frustration. Institutionalized racism and apartheid took control of black people's lives causing great hardships, poverty, despair and disease in the homelands. Because bad policy choices and denial of people's basic needs are seeds of conflict, the government of South Africa witnessed as a result, organized strikes by members of the banned African Nationalist Congress (ANC), and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) with the support of the Union of Democratic Party (UDF). Violence also increased between 1976 and 1980 in the mostly black townships of Johannesburg and Soweto, where youth and school children were trying to make the townships ungovernable (see John Kane-Berman, 1993: 29-31). The brutal police repression and closure of schools forced many youths to flee the townships and join the militant wing of the banned ANC where they continued the liberation struggle. Apartheid made the lives of blacks very difficult in the face of increasing scarcity in the homelands. The little that trickled in was hotly competed for and in most cases became a means of building patronages for the elites. (Mzala, 1987; Gerhard Mare`. 1993) found that the Zulu traditional ruler, Chief Mongosuthu Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Movement represent a good example of how resources were misused for patronage networks in his KwaZulu homeland. Distribution of the resources in this homeland was skewed to favor those loyal to the chief, while marginalizing members of other ethnic groups who lived in the area. Mare` (1993) posited that the strategy, "aims to hide the class interests of the cultural entrepreneurs, to paper over horizontal stratification such as those of class and gender, through a kind of ethnic popularism; and to advance the class interests of the mobilizers." (Mare` and Hamilton, 1987) found that Inkatha being a cultural group as well as a political party, controlled the middle class businessmen and professionals. Mare,´(1993) posited that Chief Buthelezi did not hide his intention to control economic and political power in the homeland. He invoked ethnic markers like language, common descent, culture and tradition to create boundaries between the Inkatha and the other ethnic groups. The behavior of Chief Buthelezi was not acceptable to the ANC who disliked the chief's cooperation with apartheid leadership and his growing ambition to usurp the leadership of the African National Congress by claiming to be the leader of black opinion in South Africa. Chief Buthelezi was once a member of the youth wing of the ANC before his overt ambition to carve out a Zulu nation, KwaZulu-Nat,l caused him to be sacked from the party. Mare, (1993) posited that the chief's policy was in opposition to the ANC armed struggle against black disenfranchisement and apartheid rule in South Africa. Inkatha´s activities and its close cooperation with the apartheid government divided the black opposition against the apartheid regime, thus strengthening the government and its oppressive policies. Chief Buthelezi and his movement were used as puppets by the apartheid state in its war against the liberation movements. Mare´, (2000) posited that Chief Buthelezi's attempt to influence the city dwellers, some of whom were not adhering to his rhetoric, escalated the ethnic conflict which engulfed many black townships in South Africa in the early 1980s through the later part of the 90s. By penetrating and influencing the activities of ethnic associations and clubs in the townships, Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi created conflict as blacks started to view their competition for scarce resources like jobs, social amenities and education, from the ethnic prism. The immediate causes of the conflict could be linked to the high rate of poverty, unemployment and politicization of every bit of life in the homelands. It is pertinent to add that these social conditions often helped the ethnic entrepreneurs to mobilize certain groups against the other group. The conflicts commonly called "black on black conflicts" were given ethnic connotation by rhetoric coming from the Inkatha camp. This conflict created rigid boundaries between the Zulus and the Xhosas and intensified the human carnage and destruction in the townships. It must be conceded that the various South African governments since 1983 have tried to find a solution to the violence, but their efforts were cosmetic because they were biased towards the Inkatha and the white Afrikaners. Furthermore, allegations by Nelson Mandela and the ANC that the South African government was giving logistical and armed support to the Inkatha sapped trust from whatever efforts the government was making to separate the warring groups. The government that oppresses its majority could not boast of effective institutions of conflict management and as a result, conflict escalated. The ethnic conflict that ensued claimed many lives and destroyed properties until 1990 when the process of democratization began. (Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, 1993) found that the boldness and wisdom of President F.W. de Klerk in 1990s to introduce reforms, which led to a democratic republic where blacks and other minorities could participate equally. This change of heart from De Klerk led to the release of political prisoners like Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, as well as the legitimization of the African National Congress. It also later paved way for a democratic election in South Africa in 1994, which the ANC won under the leadership of Nelson Mandela.
Comparative Conflict Management Approaches
In view of the intensity of the ethnic conflicts that have rocked Nigeria and South Africa, both countries have worked to develop constitutionally backed institutions for conflict management. In South Africa, after a difficult and courageous political negotiation between the country's various interest groups, the state has prevented further violence by developing multiple democratic approaches to create a foundation for peace and security. The architects of the new South African constitution crafted an impressive document aimed to heal the wounds of the past and establish a society based on social justice, fundamental human rights and rule of law. The constitution guarantees freedom of association, languages and religion and includes a bill of rights.
Secondly, the government has created affirmative action packages for disadvantaged groups, which emphasise "management of diversity." They are meant, among other things, to address the structural racism created by the apartheid state.
Thirdly, the structure of the South African government was constitutionally changed to make way for a government of national unity. Power-sharing mechanisms were included in the constitution to prevent the ethnic or racial domination of any group. The composition of the new government confirms a trend towards accommodation and tolerance, which also helped to legitimise the government.
Fourthly, the constitution dismantled the homelands. This act signified the end of apartheid. As mentioned above, the conditions in the black reservations were inhuman. Poverty was endemic and social amenities and jobs were scarce. The neglect of the homelands and townships made the people vulnerable to ethnic entrepreneurs and warlords who were fighting for power and economic resources. Following the dismantling of the ethnic homelands, the constitution provided for the creation of nine provinces in place of the former four provinces that existed during apartheid. This decision aimed to distribute power between sub-national units. The provinces enjoy relative autonomy, thus helping to de-escalate conflict. The fifth step taken towards peaceful conflict management was the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) chaired by Arch-bishop Desmond Tutu, which helped to heal the wounds inflicted by the apartheid system. It also helped to inculcate a commitment to accountability and transparency into South African public life. The sixth step the ANC government took was meant to address the roots of economic inequalities. The ANC introduced an ambitious plan of action called the "Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP was aimed at encouraging disadvantaged groups, especially blacks, to participate equally with others in business. To manage her complex ethnic problem, Nigeria, like South Africa, has developed mechanisms for ethnic conflict management. Constitutionally, Nigeria opted for federalism and secularism to manage ethnic and regional misunderstanding Like South Africa, a bill of rights was included in the 1999 constitution, which was intended to allay the fears of ethnic minorities in the South. Past Nigerian dictators had been under enormous pressure from minority groups for a more fair distribution of power. From 1967 to 1999, thirty-six states were created in Nigeria, which cut across ethnic and religious lines. This move was meant to further allay the ethnic groups' fears of being dominated by the three major linguistic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo and the Yoruba. However, the viability of these new states is unclear, with the exception of the oil-producing states in the South. Some of these states have recently become conduits for the personal enrichment of the elites at the expense of alleviating poverty and creating job opportunities for the rest of the population. There have been reports of disparities in the distribution of the oil resources in Nigeria for many years. This contentious issue has fuelled most of the recent ethnic conflicts in the country. Though the constitution provided for a new system of resource allocation, ethnic groups from the oil and mineral producing areas see the new system as inadequate, arguing they are not receiving enough money for their own regional development. These are the dynamics behind the Ogoni crisis and the recent sporadic ethnic violence in the oil producing Niger Delta states. I would argue that unless this issue is resolved, by a national conference, the economic base of the country will be jeopardized
References
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Schmid’s Typology of Global Conflicts
On a broader platform and at a global level, Schmid (2000:77-78) gives a typology, which is more encompassing of all types of contemporary (armed) violent conflict. The percentage indicated against each type shows the frequency with which they occurred between 1985 and 1994 from a total of 102 violent conflicts around the world.
Type A: Anti-regime wars or Political and Ideological conflicts (19.6%):
State Versus Insurrection. There are different forms: liberation movements Vs. Colonial powers; popular movements and/ or social-revolutionary movements vs. authoritarian state; destabilizing or re-establishing a status ante e.g. Contrast Vs. revolutionary state. Today some former destabilization conflicts are mutated to become dominantly ethno-nationalist or ethnic – tribalist
(e.g. in Afghanistan and Angola).
Type B: ethno-nationalists conflicts (44.1%)
These conflicts come in diverse forms but mostly as intra-state conflicts (state versus nation); sometimes as interstate conflicts. Ethno-nationalist conflicts
are the most frequent types of contemporary armed conflicts and wars in Africa and elsewhere; such conflicts are generally of long duration (decades), only in a few cases would conflict resolution help to create new states. Possibilities for conflict resolution in such cases range from concessions regarding cultural autonomy and diverse degrees of autonomy to (con) federal solutions and sovereign statehood.
Type C: interstate Conflicts (11.8%)
State Versus state, this is earlier seen as the “classic type” of warfare. Examples are: Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the 11-day war between Mali and Burkina Faso
(Dec. 1985) or the Invasion of USA in Panama (Dec. 1989).
Type D: Decolonisation Wars or Foreign–State-Occupations(FSO) (4.9%)
Since the 1940s former European Colonial territories have been liberated, occupied and annexed by non-European regional powers. There are also a number of Afro-Asian cases where non-European powers act as occupying forces; e.g. Western Shara, East-Timor, West-Papua, Palestine and Eritrea (until 1991-1992). Most examples of type D conflicts are predominantly ethno-national in character. Since the United Nations General Assembly generally looked upon anti-European and anti-colonial struggles favourably, international law treats such conflicts differently from type B conflicts.
Type E: Inter-ethnic or tribal Conflicts (13.7)
Type E falls under the broad banner of ‘banner of ‘ethnic conflict’ also but is
differentiated by the actors and aims involved. Such conflicts are often fought without a state actor taking part; the issues are sectarian and Sectoral i.e. particular interest, tribalism, clan conflicts, chauvinism, and narrow nationalism.
Type F: Gang Wars (3.9%)
This involves predominantly non-state (mixed with criminal elements), especially in situation of state collapse. Actors are often village militias, demobilized soldiers or mercenaries. Other actors are death squads, professional killers, the Mafia, Syndicates or professional groups. Another type opposes settlers, migrants and indigenous peoples as the case in the mountainous areas of Bangladesh, in the Kenyan Rift Valley, and in Eastern Nicaragua.
Genocide (2.0%)
This is state- organized mass murder and crimes against humanity characterized by the intention to exterminate a particular national, ethnic, “racial” or religious group. Mass murder committed against members of a particular political group (politicide) or social group (democide) are equally horrifying crimes against humanity. A careful study of Schmid’s typology above shows that all types of conflict identified have featured, albeit at varied degrees, in Africa. Type F is the least frequent but with the trend of economic downturn in the continent, this type is also more probably to increase.
Department for International Development (DFID): Typology of Conflicts in Africa
In the same token, DFID (2003:8-9) identifies four distinct types of
conflict in Africa. They are;
•Conventional warfare- wars of attrition
•Factional warfare
•Genocide and ethnic based conflict
•The “new warfare”- regional conflict
Conventional Warfare- Wars of Attrition
The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was the only conventionally fought war in Africa during the last one and a half decades. It was fought with regular troops along a defined series of fronts. Targets and objectives were primarily military and strategic.
Factional Warfare
Factional wars are fluid by nature. There is rarely a defined front line and fighting is frequently opportunistic rather than strategic. Warfare is low tech and small arms are the main weapon. Such wars are not costly and can easily be sustained without external support. Countries currently affected by factional warfare are Somalia, Liberia (Internally), Uganda (internally), Namibia and Cote D’voire.
Genocide and Ethnic Based Conflict
Terrible levels of ethnic violence and genocide, as earlier witnessed in Rwanda and Burundi between the ethnic Tutsi and Hutu, re-emerged in the last decade of the 20th century Africa. At this time, failed states such as Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Zaire became centres of regional insecurity and had degenerated into crosscutting politico-ethnic conflicts resulting in genocidal wars., with particular reference to Liberia, Doe’s ethnic Krahn and Mandingo its ally, and Quitwormkpa’s Gio and Mano groups engaged in a genocidal conflict, groups started proliferating. This type of conflict spread like wildfire and leaves a huge death toll, massive displacement, fear and confusion. Ethnic and genocidal fighting tends to involve the use extremely low technology, the use of knives, machetes, and occasionally small arms. A distinguishing characteristic is the speed with which genocidal attacks take place and the high degree of central organization and planning involved.
The “New Warfare”- Regional Conflict
All three elements of warfare above have coalesced into what can be described as Africa’s “new warfare”-regional conflict. African countries increasingly intervened militarily in neighboring states and justify their actions on the grounds of necessary self protection. Conflicts become increasingly regional in nature as collapsed states threaten the security of their neighbours. The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) involves the armed forces of eight countries, and the DRC has sought to take the war back into Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda where it, allegedly, came from. The war in Liberia also developed a similar regional dimension. It begat wars in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote D’Ivoire respectively.
Interpersonal and psychological dimensions of conflict.
The relationship between interpersonal and more general psychological approaches to conflict is that both in different ways reflect conflict researchers’ general assumption that conflict has common patterns and processes at different levels, e.g. from the local community to the international system level. Traditionally, interpersonal and psychological dimensions of conflict have been discussed in terms of cognitive psychology, or concerns with images, perceptions, stereotyping and group processes. The relationship between cognitive psychology and conflict has been particularly evident in the literature on decision-making and in analyses of conflict as a nonrational process.
References
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Communication and Conflict Management
Communication is very important to conflict management. Wilmot and Hocker (1998) found that conflict management ‘starts from clarification of communication and checking of perception’ which involves the following:
• speaking out what is on one’s mind;
• listening carefully;
• expressing strong feelings appropriately;
• asking questions;
• remaining rational;
• maintaining a spirit of give and take;
• avoiding harmful or inflammatory statements;
• asking directly what is going on;
• telling others one’s opinion;
• looking for flexible ‘shades of grey solutions’;
• recognising the power of initiating a cooperative move;
• identifying conflict patterns; and lastly,
• Engaging in negotiations of agreements and settlements.
The point being made is that conflict management requires a high level of communication skills especially when such managements involve cross-cultural settings.
Communication and Problem Solving
When problem solving, parties seek a mutually acceptable solution to their conflict. "The parties or their representatives talk freely to one another. They exchange information about their interests and priorities, work together to identify the true issues dividing them, brainstorm in search of alternatives that bridge their opposing interests, and collectively evaluate these alternatives from the viewpoint of their mutual welfare." Parties may either compromise; agree on a procedure to determine who should win, or develop an integrative solution. Integrative solutions are the most desirable, because they maximize both parties gain, and because they can diminish the parties perception of conflicting interests. Pruitt and Rubin suggest five techniques for creating integrative options. Parties may "expand the pie" by increasing the available resources. "In non-specific compensation, One Party gets what he or she wants, and the other is repaid in some unrelated coin." In logrolling, parties trade concessions on low priority issues. Cost cutting seeks ways to meet a party's goals with minimal or no cost to the other party. The parties may use bridging to invent new options that substantially satisfy both of their basic interests. In order to bridge or cost-cut effectively, the parties must have some understanding of the interests that underlie their positions, and of the deeper interests that underlie those interests. Sometimes deeper interests can be reconciled even when superficial interests conflict. "When one seeks the interests underlying divergent positions, one often finds that the issue under consideration has a different meaning to each of the two parties." For instance, one party may be concerned with substance and the others with appearances, or one with the short term and the other with the long term. The authors suggest a four step problem-solving process. First, parties
must clarify and explain the situation, to determine whether there is really a conflict of interests present. Secondly, each party must thoroughly examine their own interests, and set reasonably high aspirations. Third, the parties should solve problems together, using the techniques above, trying to create an integrative solution that satisfies both parties interests. Finally, if no integrative solution can be found, one or both parties must lower their aspirations, and search again for an integrative solution. Parties must be firm about their basic interests, flexible about how those interests may be satisfied, and remain responsive to the other party's interests. If there are many issues at stake, then the parties will need to develop an agenda. Usually it is best to put the easiest issues first on the agenda. Deciding that no agreement is final until all are allowed for logrolling on the later issues. When issues are very complex, parties may begin by first agreeing on an overarching formula for how talks will proceed. Often, a party's interests are psychologically (but not practically) linked together. Such psychological linkages must be broken down to increase the parties' flexibility and increase the potential for an integrative solution. There are risks in shifting toward a problem solving strategy when the other side is contending strongly. The strategic shift may be seen as a sign of weakness, and so cause the contending party to intensify their efforts. Raising integrative options may be interpreted as backing off a position. Discussing one's interests may give an advantage to the other party. To minimize these risks, parties often use covert tactics to test the other's interest in shifting towards a joint problem-solving strategy. One such covert tactics is to have back-channel contacts, meeting in informal, private or even secret venues, to explore problem solving. "Intermediaries provide greater protection against image loss and information loss than is found in back-channel meetings, because it is even less clear whether they represent the thinking of the people who sent them." Parties may also use conciliatory signals to invite problem solving. Such signals must be both noticeable, so the other side gets the message, and undeniably, so the first party can save face. A party may also try overt persuasive tactics to draw the other side into problem solving. The key to effective recruitment is to convey a firm but conciliatory stance toward the others. Parties signal firmness by making a vigorous statement of their interests and having constituents make strong statements, by being unwilling to make unilateral concessions, and by developing a modest amount of threat capability. Careful use of contentious tactics can also signal firmness without triggering escalation. Parties can signal their conciliatory intent by expressing their willingness to adopt integrative solutions, by expressing concern for the other party, by keeping the lines of communication open, and by rewarding the other's cooperative gestures. Parties may also make unilateral trust-building initiatives, for instance, by using the Gradual Reduction in Tensions (GRIT) strategy.
Elements of Conflict Management Process
• Third Party Interventions
• Mediation
• Negotiation
Third Party Intervention
The terms "third party" and "intermediary" are both used to refer to a person or team of people who become involved in a conflict to help the disputing parties manage or resolve it. Third parties might act as consultants, helping one side or both sides analyze the conflict and plan an effective response. Alternatively, they might act as facilitators, arranging meetings, setting agendas, and guiding productive discussions. Facilitators will also usually record what was said, and may write up a short report summarizing the discussions and any agreements that were reached. A more active and powerful third party role is that of mediator. Mediators, not only facilitate discussions, but they usually impose a structure and process on the discussions that is designed to move the parties towards mutual understanding and win-win agreements. While many different styles of mediations are common, most mediators have the conflicting parties sit down together to explain to each other their views about the nature of the problem and how they think it might best be solved. The mediator often tries to get the disputants to focus on underlying interests (the things they really need or want) more than their initial opening positions (what they initially say they need or want). By clarifying the divergent views and reasons for those views, mediators can usually get the parties to develop a common understanding of the situation, which often yields a solution which satisfies the interests of all parties. While some mediators take a stronger role in option identification and selection than others, mediators do not have the power to impose a solution. At most, they can suggest a solution, which the disputants may or may not accept. The most powerful third party role is that of an arbitrator. An arbitrator listens to presentations made by both sides, examines written materials and other evidence relating to a case, and then makes a determination of who is right and who is wrong, or how a conflict should be settled. Usually, the arbitrator’s decision is binding and cannot be appealed. Thus, the arbitrator is the most powerful type of intermediary. Arbitration works well when the parties simply want a settlement, and do not worry about losing control of the process or the outcome. For parties that want to maintain control, however, the other forms of intervention (mediation or facilitation) are often preferred.
Role of Third Parties
Agyris (1970) posited that intervene means “to enter into an ongoing system of relationships, to come between or among persons, groups, or objects for the purpose of helping them “(Hoffman, 1993) posited that intervention is “a move by state or an international organization to involve itself in the domestic affair of another state, whether the state consents or not”. The point about intervention is that it usually involves a third party. Third parties change conflicts, often for the better, just by being present. Third parties can play many roles. They may act formally or informally. They may act as individuals, or as representatives of some larger group. They may be invited to participate by the conflicting parties, or they may intervene spontaneously. Usually an effective third party will be impartial; however there are occasions when a partial role can be helpful. Third parties may be limited to advising the parties, or they may be able to make binding decisions for the parties. They may intervene in conflicts between individuals or between groups. Some third parties will focus on the substance of the dispute, while others focus on improving the conflict process.
Forms of Third Party Intervention
Pruitt and Rubin describe three effective forms of third-party intervention. First, third parties may intervene to modify the physical or social structure of the conflict. They can facilitate communication, offer a neutral or private venue for talks, impose a timeline and deadlines, contribute resources, and call up public pressure. Second, third parties can change the structure of the issue in a conflict. They can help the parties identify issues and interests, and break psychological linkages. They can help the parties group and order the issues to be addressed.
And they can introduce new issues, alternative solutions and superordinate goals. Thus, such intervention can further motivate the conflicting parties to reach an agreement. Third parties help participants save face by accepting responsibility for concessions. They manage parties' emotions and absorb hostility. They can also help sustain the parties' momentum toward a resolution.
Intervention Types
Generally, nations decide how to intervene based on three factors. The first consideration is the intervening nation's own capabilities and connection to the conflict. Secondly, they consider the status and ripeness of the conflict for resolution. Thirdly, intervention is influenced by the characters of the parties and their decision-making systems. Crocker argues that a fourth factor should be given increased attention; Nations should compare the cost of intervention to the cost of doing nothing. Intervention may be military or diplomatic. Currently, military intervention is not the most typical form used, although it is called for, on occasion. Diplomatic intervention may be sustained and strategic or it may be episodic. The United States has pursued long-term strategic diplomatic intervention in the Middle East. Strategic diplomatic intervention remains fairly uncommon, however. Episodic, crisis-driven interventions are the most common form of diplomatic intervention. Such interventions can be effective at containing violence, but alone, do not tend to produce settlements or resolutions. Interventions by non-governmental organization are new, and on the increase. NGO interventions are likely more effective, than what the governments gives them credit for, but somewhat less effective than they themselves claim.
Types of intervention include:
• Preventive Intervention before the outbreak of a conflict.
• Pre-emptive Intervention Crocker argues that the most effective way of dealing with violent internal conflicts is pre-emptively by acting early, before the violence becomes severe. Nations undergoing repression or violent upheaval should be encouraged to pursue negotiated alternatives. Arranging a face-saving exit for soon to be deposed leaders, can also be an effective way of preventing further violence.
Generally, pre-emptive intervention should focus on those conditions which shape and spark ethnic conflicts. Crocker argues that the key to identifying and understanding those conditions is to understand "the process by which politicized conflicts become militarized." Militarized conflicts are more complex and more costly to deal with. The goal then is to intervene pre-emptively to prevent political conflicts from becoming militarized. Crocker describes three examples of such pre-emptive intervention. First, nations may seek to avoid premature and possibly polarizing elections. Secondly, nations should be more vigorous in their attempts to disarm and reintegrate former combatants into civil society. Thirdly, Crocker argues that simple secession is unlikely to put an end to internal conflicts. If a nation is to break-up, the international community must insist on an
agreed, negotiated separation.
• Curative intervention that aims at the solution, limitation, control or regulation of an existing conflict;
• De-escalating intervention that aims at reducing tension and must be based on insight into the factors and mechanisms that led to escalation in the first place; and;
• Escalating intervention it can be in the interest of a permanent conflict resolution to escalate a “cold” conflict (one in which the parties avoid both contact and confrontation).
Factors that influence the Intervention Decision
Opponents of intervention typically raise two points. First, they argue that ethnic conflicts are often too intense for effective intervention. The combatants should be allowed to exhaust each other, and also their desire for peace to grow, before intervention is attempted. Secondly, intervention in internal conflicts violates the target nation's sovereignty. Outsiders lack a clear mandate to justify their intervention. They often lack the skills and knowledge to intervene effectively. Still, there have been some significant and successful interventions into internal conflicts. The UN oversight of the decolonization of Namibia, and the Cambodian elections are two notable examples. Crocker asks, when then should intervention be attempted or avoided? He suggests that in general "we probably should avoid military entanglement in nationalist revolutions and civil wars pitting whole groups and classes against one another." Crocker notes two exceptions to this generalization. First, we may intervene militarily if there are overarching strategic reasons to do so. Secondly, we may intervene if the issue is important, and success at a reasonable cost seems likely.
Achieving successful Interventions
What exactly constitutes a successful intervention, is itself a matter of much debate. For some conflicts, merely avoiding even greater tragedy may count as a success. In defining success, Crocker argues that "the important point is that those who decide to intervene...have an obligation to develop their own definition of success, and to keep it firmly in mind while labouring to avoid becoming part of the problem and making things worse." Whatever standard of success is adopted, certain general considerations apply. The intervention operation itself must have an efficient, responsive decision-making system. Decision-makers must be held accountable for their decisions. The operation must take measures to ensure that, its forces are not taken hostage or targeted directly by the combatants. The intervening group must retain and exercise consistent control over the nature and timing of the intervention. Interventions tend to fail if the intervening group loses the initiative. The intervention must be backed up by adequate information about the situation. Often the particular characters of the key players, makes a crucial difference in the outcome of an intervention. Successful UN interventions tend to exhibit these features.
Mediation
Due to polarity occasioned by issues in the conflict, conflict parties often find it difficult to negotiate hence, the coming in of a third person to facilitate negotiation disputants. Moore (1996),posited that intervention in a negotiation or conflict of an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power but who assists the involved parties in voluntarily reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute. Goodpaster,(1997)found mediation as: “a problem-solving negotiation process, in which an outside, impartial neutral party works with disputants to assist them to reach a satisfactory negotiated agreement. Unlike judges or arbitrators, mediators have no authority to decide the dispute between the parties; instead, the parties empower the mediator to help them resolve the issue between them.” Mediation is an informal, voluntary and confidential process in which a trained professional dispute resolver (the mediator) facilitates understanding, communication and negotiation between disputing parties and assists those parties in reaching their own mutually acceptable resolution to their dispute. Where the dispute is already in litigation the parties are normally assisted in mediation by their legal counsel. Mediation differs from negotiation, in that parties with apparently incompatible demands turn over the dispute resolution process, but not the dispute itself, to the mediator. Mediation differs from arbitration, in that a mediator makes no decisions as to how the case should be resolved; rather the mediator guides the parties in making this determination. Mediation differs from case evaluation, in that the mediator makes no finding as to the value of the claims and there is no penalty if the mediation is unsuccessful. Mediation differs from litigations, in that it is quicker and less expensive and allows the parties to work-out their own solutions in private rather than having an unknown result imposed on them by a judge or jury in a lengthy, expensive and formal process. Mediation is built upon all of the following concepts:
• Voluntariness,
• Privacy,
• Confidentiality,
• Economy,
• Promptness,
• Informality,
• Control of hearing dates,
• Lack of risk,
• Lack of fear of an appeal from a favourable result,
• Opportunity for parties to tell their entire story without rules of evidence,
• High likelihood agreement is not violated.
Types of Mediators
Albert (2001:86) found three major types of mediators. They are:
• Social network mediators,
• Authoritative mediators,
• Independent mediators.
Social Network Mediators
This consists of individuals who are invited to intervene in a conflict basically because of their close relationship with the disputants, or largely because they are in the same social group (network) with the disputants. The mediator could, therefore, be a friend, neighbour, or member of the same political group, etc. The mediator gets the cooperation of the disputants because he is considered trustworthy.
Authoritative Mediators
These are those in authoritative relationship with the disputants in the sense of occupying a position of authority well known to, recognized and respected by the disputants. The “authority of the mediator in this kind of situation is dependent on his access to resources which the two sides to the conflict value so much. An authoritative mediator is, however, not expected to impose his decision on the disputants. But he expected to impose his decision on the disputants. But he could persuade or indirectly influence them to reach a quick decision.
Independent Mediators
These are neutral persons entirely. An independent mediator has no vested interest in the conflict and, therefore is expected by the two sides to be impartial in helping them work through their problems. Independent mediators are professionals who have mediation firms that could be consulted from time to time by disputants.
Foundations of Mediation
Third parties mediate based on their desire to make peace, and and their own self-interest. Self-interest is the primary motivation for states. States are motivated by both defensive and offensive interests. Defensive interests include promoting international stability, and protecting the mediating nation's foreign interests. Often nations will attempt to mediate a conflict in order to prevent rival powers from intervening and expanding their influence. States may also fear being drawn into the escalating conflict. When motivated by defensive interests, mediators often have some stake in achieving particular outcomes. When acting on the offence, states mediate conflicts in order to extend and increase their own influence. For instance, successful mediation may earn the gratitude of other nations. In such cases states usually have less interest in the content of the settlement. As an example of how selfinterest motivates third-parties, the authors offer the case of U.S. mediation during and after the Cold War. During the Cold War, the U.S. was quick to mediate international conflicts. By doing so, they extended their influence and blocked expansion of Soviet influence. With the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (U.S.S.R.), the United States (U.S.) has been less eager to intervene. Less powerful nations also act on defensive and offensive self-interests. In addition smaller states may attempt mediation because they lack other foreign policy tools and as a way of avoiding being drawn into the conflict as participants. Non-state organizations generally emphasize peacekeeping as their main motive. However, such groups are also motivated by an interest in upholding their reputations. Intergovernmental organizations, such as the U.N., are influenced by the policies and interests of their member states. The author’s note that non-state organizations are often "interested in a particular outcome, not because it affects them directly, but because they believe in its inherent desirability." Parties to a conflict accept mediation when they believe it is in their best interests to do so; that is, when they believe that "mediation will gain an outcome that is more favourable than the outcome gained by continued conflict." Similarly, parties will accept mediation when rejecting it will result in greater harms. Parties may fear incurring bad relationship with the proposed mediating nation or international sanctions if they refuse to negotiate. In addition, mediation may offer parties a way to negotiate compromise without losing face. The mediator may also be seen as guarantor of the final settlement.
Types of Mediation
Facilitative Mediation
In the 1960's and 1970's, there was only one type of mediation being taught and practiced, which is now being called "Facilitative Mediation". In facilitative mediation, the mediator structures a process to assist the parties in reaching a mutually agreeable resolution. The mediator asks questions; validates and normalizes parties' points of view; searches for interests underneath the positions taken by parties; and assists the parties in finding and analyzing options for resolution. The facilitative mediator does not make recommendations to the parties, give his or her own advice or opinion as to the outcome of the case, or
predict what a court would do in the case. The mediator is in charge of the process, while the parties are in charge of the outcome. Facilitative mediators want to ensure that parties come to agreements based on information and understanding. They predominantly hold joint sessions with all parties present so that the parties can hear each other's points of view, but hold caucuses regularly. They want the parties to have the major influence on decisions made, rather than the parties’ attorneys. Facilitative mediation grew up in the era of volunteer dispute resolution centres, in which the volunteer mediators were not required to have substantive expertise concerning the area of the dispute, and in which most often there were no attorneys present. The volunteer mediators came from all backgrounds. These things are still true today, but in addition many professional mediators, with and without substantive expertise, also practice facilitative mediation.
Evaluative Mediation
Evaluative mediation is a process modelled on settlement conferences held by judges. An evaluative mediator assists the parties in reaching resolution by pointing out the weaknesses of their cases, and predicting what a judge or jury would be likely to do. An evaluative mediator might make formal or informal recommendations to the parties as to the outcome of the issues. Evaluative mediators are concerned with the legal rights of the parties, rather than their needs and interests, and evaluate based on legal concepts of fairness. Evaluative mediators meet most often in separate meetings with the parties and their attorneys, practicing "shuttle diplomacy". They help the parties and attorneys evaluate their legal position and the costs vs. the benefits of pursuing a legal resolution rather than settling in mediation. The evaluative mediator structures the process, and directly influences the outcome of mediation.
Evaluative mediation emerged in court-mandated or court-referred mediation. Attorneys normally work with the court to choose the mediator, and are active participants in the mediation. The parties are most often present in the mediation, but the mediator may meet with the attorneys alone as well as with the parties and their attorneys. There is an assumption in evaluative mediation that the mediator has substantive expertise or legal expertise in the substantive area of the dispute. Because of the connection between evaluative mediation and the courts, and because of their comfort level with settlement conferences, most
evaluative mediators are attorneys.
Transformative Mediation
Folgers and Bush (1994) found that transformative mediation is based on the values of "empowerment" of each of the parties as much as possible, and "recognition" by each of the parties’ needs, interests, values and points of view. The potential for transformative mediation is that any or all parties or their relationships may be transformed during the mediation. Transformative mediators meet with parties together, since only they can give each other
"recognition". In some ways, the values of transformative mediation mirror those of early facilitative mediation, in its interest in empowering parties and transformation. Early facilitative mediators fully expect to transform society with these pro-peace techniques. And they did. Modern transformative mediators want to continue that process by allowing and supporting the parties in mediation to determine the direction of their own process. In transformative mediation, the parties, structure both the process and the outcome of mediation, and the mediator follows their lead.
Ethical dilemmas in Mediation
Zartman and Touval (1989) found three ethical dilemmas which arise in international conflict mediation. First, mediators are often torn between the short-term goal of ending bloodshed and the longer-term goal of settling the conflict. A cease-fire may create a tolerable stalemate, and so end bloodshed at the cost of stalling settlement negotiations. Mediators may also be faced with a choice between pursuing "an attainable settlement that violates international norms, or holding out for one that is consistent with the principles of justice adopted by the international community."(p. 459). On the one hand, people argue that some settlement is better than no settlement and continued warfare. On the other hand, people point out those unjust settlements rarely last, and that tolerating such settlements may serve to undermine the foundations of international order and security. The Bosnian conflict presents a stark example of this dilemma.
Finally, mediation facilitates settlement of conflicts, but does not ensure reconciliation or remove the causes of conflict. Mediators must follow through on settlements, supporting implementation and holding the parties to their agreement. Yet to be effective, mediators must avoid becoming embroiled in the conflict. It has been said that most of life's problems have a simple and elegant solution. I believe that this saying is true and that mediation is very often the elegant, although frequently stressful, solution to conflicts ranging from noisy neighbour disputes to complex medical malpractice disputes. While mediation does not always work and is not always appropriate, it almost always is a no-risk, quick and economical tool to settle disputes. Indeed, approximately 80% of all cases that are voluntarily mediated are resolved by this process. In some senses, mediation is the opposite of litigation. In litigation the goal is generally to intimidate the other party into settling the case, but mediation persuades the parties to settle. The only requirements for successful mediation are a skilful mediator and parties who are able to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions with civility and objectivity and who are willing to candidly discuss their interests directly with the other party. Attorneys who understand the often counter-intuitive mediation process are normally quite helpful in mediating litigated cases. The key to understanding mediation is realizing that the party never looses control of their position to the court, their attorney or the mediator. Only a settlement that is fully acceptable to a party can ever be established. And because the settlement is not imposed upon the party by someone else, the party always leaves the dispute with a feeling of autonomy and fairness. While litigation is often destructive, mediation is always constructive. And while litigation is often very costly in both time and money, mediation is always brief and inexpensive. Mediation allows all parties to completely eliminate the risk of a totally unacceptable outcome being imposed on them by a court. It also eliminates the very high, and often underappreciated, emotional cost which litigation imposes on all participants. Mediation also always turns off the “meter” of litigation costs, attorney fees and lost productivity. The actual process of mediation is simple and transparent. The disputing parties, and there may be more than two, agree on the selection of a competent mediator who is experienced in the process of inter-personal facilitative-mediation. Prior experience in the subject matter of the dispute is not a requirement inasmuch as the mediator will not have to decide any substantive issues. Insight into the actual workings of the judicial system, however, is very desirable in a mediator. But, absolute neutrality, patience, and the ability to preserve confidences are requirements for any mediator. A mediator will set a mutually agreeable time and place for the mediation and assure that all persons necessary for resolution of the dispute will be present in an informal and private setting.
Skills and behaviours for non-adversarial Mediation
• Listening, reading body language, sensing moods, and being aware of emotional issues that are not explicitly mentioned.
• Breaking disputes into manageable chunks, and resolving each chunk separately.
• Postponing discussions of very tough issues to late in the meditation session. Once the parties have started agreeing on simple issues, an atmosphere of trust will begin to grow, and agreement on difficult issues will become faster.
• Keeping the discussion focussed on the issues.
• Restating points in appropriate language to help each party understand the other’s point of view.
• Restating in neutral language those points on which the parties appear to agree, verifying that they do in fact agree.
• Using humour to bring people together and defuse tense situations. Note that most skilled arbitrators have similar skills, but do not usually use them in the same way.
Negotiation
Negotiation is the process whereby two or more parties, who are faced with a problem of conflict about some limited resources, attempt to agree on how best to solve the problem or resolve the conflict. In the same vein, negotiation can be viewed as any form of communication adopted with the aim of reaching a common ground and compromise. It is also any form of verbal communication, direct or indirect, whereby parties to a conflict of interest discuss, without resort to arbitration or other judicial processes, take a joint action to manage the dispute between them. Negotiation is a back and forth communication designed to reach agreement between parties that have both shared and opposed interests. In the process of negotiation both parties modify their demands to achieve a mutually acceptable compromise a process of adjusting both parties’ views of their ideal outcome to an attainable outcome.
Negotiation may be facilitated by a third party. He the third party helps, the conflict parties to reach a mutually satisfying agreement. Facilitation involves the use of techniques to improve the flow of information in a meeting between parties in disputes. Another aspect of negotiation is conciliation. It is the act of taking peace messages to and from parties in conflict. It seeks the promotion of attitudinal and behavioural changes that will build a positive relationship between parties in dispute.
Understanding the Negotiation Process
Pre-negotiation settings.
No matter how skilled a negotiator might be, a conflict situation is not likely to move towards resolution unless, in the words of Richard Haas, the situation is "ripe". Determining ripeness has brought the theoretician and the practitioner closer together, and if one reviews recent literature, it would seem that the Norwegian inspired Israel-Palestinian negotiations seem to have been a convenient "case study" for both. As opposed to many of conventional diplomatic assumptions about diplomacy and diplomatic procedures, both the practitioner and the conflict analyst, or theoretician, look for less formal ways to explore how to break deadlocks, to explore possible negotiation frameworks rather than negotiate. The key in such circumstances is to facilitate or at least anticipate changes in the perceptions of contending parties, particularly when one adversary sees another as capable of cooperative behaviour. Ultimately, the objective of pre-negotiation settings should not be seen as preliminary negotiations over a specific issue, but rather a process in which problems are defined, a commitment to negotiate is made and arrangements for eventual negotiations are broached. Linked to the issue of the "ripe moment" is a continued interest in the question of de-escalatory moves. This is an issue that Zartman has considered extensively as well as Haas, the latter in the context of Cyprus, South Africa and Northern Ireland. Also the "rules of the game" that will be central to any negotiating process have occupied the attention of various scholars. Two examples are de Nevers and Horowitz. There is a growing interest in the role of informal and unofficial intervention in pre-negotiations as well as in the negotiation process itself. This sort of informal or unofficial involvement in gaining the consent of contending parties to begin negotiations is all part of what has become known as "Track Two" diplomacy. McDonald in a US State Department publication outlines the assumptions that underlie Track Two measures, and Pettigrew provides some interesting insights on how certain organisations, e.g., the Quaker Movement, can help move prenegotiation processes along. Saunders, Cohen and Curle all add different perspectives to the advantages as well as the limits of Track Two methods.
Conflict and Negotiations.
The predominant literature in the field of conflict and negotiations concerns third party mediators, facilitators or, less frequently, third party arbitrators. Anstey, Deng and Ury all give valuable points about what such negotiators need to do and the barriers that they can anticipate. This, by no means is to ignore the stream of "getting from ‘no’ to ‘yes’" type studies and more popular literature that seek to demonstrate that one-on-one, or bilateral negotiations, can result in "win-win" outcomes. Yet, the ways that third parties can move the negotiation process preoccupies the academic literature, and also the practitioner and negotiator at the international level, faced with inter and intra-state conflict from the Balkans to Cyprus, from the Middle East to Indonesia. Three broad issues appear to dominate recent studies on third-party intervention, i.e., who intervenes, how and when. Various typologies have been developed to correlate appropriate types and levels of intervention to types of conflict situations. Within such typologies, it is interesting to note the focus of many upon "peacekeepers" and indeed "peace-makers" as intermediaries in conflict negotiations. Cost-benefit analyses have been considered by scholars such as Jabri in order to determine the types of interest calculations that bring third party interveners to assist in negotiations.
Under the rubric of the how of intervention, there are four essential considerations that emerge out of the analysis of third party intervention. The first concerns the different impacts upon negotiations of a bargaining versus problem-solving approach. Cultural determinants upon third party intervention represent another area of considerable interest, as are the analysis of intentional or unintentional bias in third party interveners. Finally, there is a great deal of analysis, found mainly in what is called the decision-making literature, about the sorts of individuals who are effective as third party negotiators, analysis which relates in some respects to the typologies of who intervenes. When to intervene incorporates a variety of concerns, including prenegotiation settings, post-negotiation implementation as well as the negotiating process, itself. As Keashley and Fisher points out, the when of intervention have to be viewed against two critical factors, i.e., stage and intervention sequence. The former encompasses such factors as discussion, polarisation, segregation and destruction, while intervention sequences range from arbitration, power mediation to consultation and violence control.
Post-negotiation implementation.
There is a growing interest in the links between negotiations and compliance, or implementation. In a recent "network newsletter" of PIN (Processes of International Negotiation), it was noted that at the interstate level the traditional diplomatic means of ensuring that states comply with their international obligations are no longer adequate. The effects of such none or inadequate compliance may nevertheless generate misunderstandings and conflict, and ways to monitor and deal with "post-negotiation" implementation become themselves means to prevent or resolve conflict. PIN has proposed that a practical starting point to deal with some of the complex dimensions of an increasing number of international agreements, etc., is to focus upon two essential issues. The first, relates to possible ways to use international organisations to promote state compliance with its obligations. The second entails "post-negotiation" processes of re-negotiation. Whether these starting points are adequate in themselves, is a moot point. However, far more important point, is that this and related researches have clearly uncovered an area of
considerable need for the practitioner as well as what should be an area of conceptual interest for those relying upon regime solutions and international legal agreements, to avoid conflict. Post-negotiation implementation also indirectly underscores the fact that conflict resolution, peace-building and conflict prevention frequently requires a process of review and re-enforcement. Peace in that sense,is indeed a process.
Strategies for successful Negotiation Tips
Solicit the Other's Perspective
In a negotiating situation use questions to find out what the other person's concerns and needs might be. You might try:
What do you need from me on this?
What are your concerns about what I am suggesting / asking?
When you hear the other person express their needs or concerns, use listening responses to make sure you heard correctly.
For example:
So, you are saying that you are worried that you will get lost in the shuffle and we will forget about you...Is that right? If I have this right, you want to make sure that the phones are covered
over lunch?
State Your Needs
The other person needs to know what you need. It is important to state not only what you need but why you need it. Often, disagreement may exist regarding the method for solving an issue, but not about the overall goal. For example:
I would like an hour on Tuesday to go to the doctor. I want to make
sure I am healthy so I can contribute better to the organization.
Prepare Options Beforehand
Before entering into a negotiating session, prepare some options that you can suggest if your preferred solution is not acceptable. Anticipate why the other person may resist your suggestion, and be prepared to counter it with an alternative.
Don't Argue
Negotiating is about finding solutions...Arguing is about trying to prove the other person wrong. We know that when negotiating turns into each party trying to prove the other one wrong, no progress gets made. Don't waste time arguing. If you disagree with something state your
disagreement in a gentle but assertive way. Don't demean the other person or get into a power struggle.
Consider Timing
There are good times to negotiate and bad times. Bad times include
those situations where there is:
•a high degree of anger on either side
•preoccupation with something else, and
•a high level of stress
Time negotiations is necessary, to avoid these times. If they arise during
negotiations, a time-out/rest period is in order, or perhaps rescheduling
to a better time.
Barriers To Successful Negotiation
Viewing Negotiation As Confrontational
Negotiation need not be confrontational. In fact effective negotiation is characterized by, the parties working together to find a solution, rather than each party trying to WIN the contest of wills. Keep in mind that the attitude that you take in negotiation (e.g. hostile, cooperative) will
set the tone for the interaction. If you are confrontational, you will have a fight on your hands.
Trying To Win At All Costs
If you "win", there must be a loser, and that can create more difficulty down the road. The best perspective in negotiation, is to try to find a solution where both parties "win". Try not to view negotiation as a contest that must be won.
Becoming Emotional
It's normal to become emotional during negotiation, that is important. However, as we get more emotional, we are less able to channel our negotiating behaviour in constructive ways. It is important to maintain control.
Not Trying To Understand the Other Person
Since we are trying to find a solution acceptable to both parties, we need to understand the other person's needs and wants, with respect to the issue. If we don't know what the person needs or wants, we will be unable to negotiate properly. Often, when we take the time to find out
about the other person, we discover that there is no significant disagreement.
Focusing On Personalities, Not Issues
Particularly with people we don't like much, we have a tendency to get off track by focusing on how difficult or obnoxious the person seems. Once this happens, effective negotiation is impossible. It is important to stick to the issues, and put aside our degree of like or dislike for the
individual.
Blaming the Other Person
In any conflict or negotiation, each party contributes, for better or for worse. If you blame the other person for the difficulty, you will create an angry situation. If you take responsibility for the problem, you will create a spirit of cooperation.
Resolving Violent Conflict Situation:
A case study of United Nations Intervention in the Liberian Civil War
At the early stages of the ECOMOG initiative, there were allegations that the United Nations had failed to show any significant concern for the tragedy that was unfolding in Liberia. Some speculated that the major powers at the Un felt slighted by the ECOWAS initiative towards solving the Liberian problem and therefore decided to look the other way, leaving the sub-regional organization to spend itself to exhaustion. There were also speculations that the UN’s peacekeeping budget had already been overstretched by the upsurge of missions which it had embarked on since the end of the Cold-War (late 1980s). The view in some quarters was that the United Nations was neither interested in the restoration of Peace in Liberia nor did it specifically endorse the ECOMOG mission to Liberia. However, the UN position was made known in February 1992, when the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali lauded the joint meeting in New York between the UN, OAU and other regional organizations which sought to bring the belligerent factions in Somalia to agree on an immediate Cessation of hostilities and conclude a ceasefire arrangement. He appreciated regional efforts at restoring peace, Obasi (1992) notes:
This joint effort will help establish a pattern for future cooperation and the means by which the United Nations could help enhance the role of regional organizations and render assistance to help them contribute to peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts. Shortly after, during his two-day official visit to Nigeria, the Secretary- General further elaborated on UN’s true position. He debunked the allegations that the United Nations was unconcerned about Liberia. He stressed the concern of the UN on Liberia and particularly on loss of lives, property and the suffering, which the situation had brought on the country. He also drew attention to humanitarian and emergency assistance given to the country by agencies of the United Nations, notably, United Nations Children Endowment Fund (UNICEF)( and United Nations High commission for Regugees (UNHCR). In early November 1992 ECOWAS made a representation to the UN Security Council. In the Council’s meeting of 19 November, the discussion within the council favoured and approved a regional solution to the Liberian conflict. The Security Council meeting formed basis of Resolution 788, which reaffirmed its belief that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord offered the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict. Resolution 788 also requested that the Secretary- General dispatch a special Representative to Liberia to evaluate the situation and impose a general and compete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia. Ero, (1995) posited that the arms embargo did not however extend to ECOMOG . The Harbel Massacre, an incident in which not less 600 civilians were slaughtered, heightened the pressure upon ECOWAS and the International Community to try to bring together the rival factions in order to resume negotiations and find a consensus to the crisis. Peacetalks were therefore conducted in the summer of 1993 with the assistance of the UN and the OAU. The talks resulted in the Cotonou Agreement, which was signed, by the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO). The agreement contained actions ranging from ceasefire through disarmament and demobilization to the holding of national elections. The parties agreed to establish a joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JCMC), comprising representatives of the three warring factions, ECOMOG and an advance team of 30 UN observers. This was the beginning of the United Nations intervention in the Liberian civil war.
The UNOMIL and Its Mandate
On 22nd September, 1993 and by resolution 866 of 1993, United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was established by the UN Security Council. UNOMIL was an observer mission to remain unarmed. ECOMOG troops were to provide the UNOMIL with security.
This was the first joint UN/regional peacekeeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in cooperation with a peacekeeping mission already set up by another organization, (UN 1998:90).
The UNOMIL mandate was to support ECOMOG in implementing the Cotonou peace agreement, especially compliance with and impartial implementation of the agreement by all parties.
UNOMIL – ECOMOG Joint Peacekeeping Operation in Liberia
One would think that the intervention of the UN in the war would bring an immediate end to the crisis based on the fact that, Charles Taylor had consistently declared that he would only disarm his troops to UN forces or some international body other than the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG which he saw as being partial. However, the progress towards implementing the Cotonou Agreement, which formed the core mandate of UNOMIL, was slow with all the options that were outlined being undermined. What was different about the Cotonou Agreement in view of the past agreements was that ECOMOG was to be expanded to include two contingents from outside the West African Sub-region – Tanzania and Uganda – and a UN observer mission. Even with all these antidotes on ground, like the Yamoussoukro IV Accords, the Cotonou Agreement did not bring peace but multiplication of warring factions. 1994 was a very rough year in the annals of the history of the Liberian war as the joint UNOMIL/ECOMOG efforts suffered serious setbacks and it became apparent that the continued fighting between the rival factions undermined the implementation process and the election of September 1994. For instance, on 9 September 1994, NPFL elements detained 43 unarmed UNOMIL military observers and 6 nongovernmental organization personnel at nine sites in the northern and eastern regions. After several negotiations between UNOMIL, NPFL and neighbouring ECOWAS Countries, all military observers and nongovernmental organization personnel were released by 18 September.
However, two Tanzanian soldiers were killed, a third later died from his wounds. As a number of obstacles continued to impede the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement several meetings were convened leading to two other agreements. These were the Akosombo Agreement (September 1994), which was a supplementary agreement to the Cotonou Agreement and the Agreement on the clarification of the Akosombo Agreement and The Acceptance, and Accession Agreement signed in Accra in December 1994. These agreements were signed to take care of the loopholes and inadequacies of the Cotonou Agreement. The UN Representative to Liberia, Trevor Gordon – Somers admitted that mistakes were made over the disarmament process that was decided in the Cotonou Agreement:
“In the Cotonou Agreement we all negotiated on the assumption of good faith … and therefore, three are aspects we did not pay sufficient attention to. For one, we did not address the issue of internal security arrangements in the country”, (UN Doc. S/1994/1167, 14 Oct. para. 2).
Though the terrain was very rough for the UNOMIL/ECOMOG, as the joint operation had to weather different storms in the course of restoring peace to the war – torn state of Liberia, but with ceasefire finally in force, ECOMOG with UNOMIL lending credibility and impartiality to its activities, ranging from disarmament and demobilization to the holding of national elections, the joint operation was able to fulfil its mandate which climaxed in the July 1997 national elections and enthronement of democratically elected government.
UN Post-Conflict activities in Liberia
In November 1997, following the completion of the UNOMIL’s Mandate, the UN established a post-conflict, peace-building support office (PBSO) in Liberia. Headed by a Representative of the Secretary- General, the office was intended to strengthen and harmonise United Nations peace-building efforts, to help promote reconciliation and respect for human rights, and to help mobilize international support for reconstruction and recovery. The UN post-conflict peace-building is essentially a preventive strategy. It prevents a relapse to conflict and it ushers in sustainable peace. It is therefore a long-term project, which involves the following:
•demilitarization of combatants;
•electoral assistance;
•re-establishing the rule of law;
•re-construction of civil society;
•economic assistance; and
•the return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS).
The UN and the ECOMOG did extensive work in the area of disarmament and demilitarization of combatants despite the uncooperative attitudes of the warring factions. This is elaborately discussed under the next sub-heading. The efforts of the UNOMIL – ECOMOG joint operation in the direction of electoral assistance and reestablishment of the rule of law resulted in the national elections of July
1997; adjudged free and fair by international observers. In the area of economic assistance and re-construction of civil society, the Secretary- General, on 3 February 1995, launched an inter-agency consolidated appeal for Liberia; seeking the US $65 million in extra-budgetary resources required by the UN agencies to embark on humanitarian assistance and initial physical re-construction in post-conflict Liberia. Consequent upon return of peace, Afolayan (2003:77) reports that 23.1 per cent of Liberian refugees returned from Cote d’Ivoire and 35.7 percent from Guinea in 1998.
Disarmament of the armed Ethnic Militias
The transition from war to peace commenced after the signing of the Accra Agreement in December 1994, which was a follow-up, and a fine tune of the Cotonou Agreement. The aim of the disarmament exercise was to retrieve all weapons of destruction from the combatants to ensure and maintain the security of the Liberian State. It was a military process targeted at the collection, registration and destruction of all conventional weapons and ammunitions retrieved from the combatants. With particular focus on the Liberian case, the Cotonou Agreement and its follow-ups the Akosombo and Accra Agreements; formed the guiding post for the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the Liberian ex-combatants. Disarmament being the ultimate objective of the ceasefire, the agreements put appropriate measures in place to enable the AFL (Armed Forces of Liberia) to assume its character as a National Army. But until such measures are completed the AFL like all other parties and warring factions shall be completely disarmed in accordance with the Cotonou agreement. In order to ensure a secure environment for the proper functioning of the unified government in Moronvia, the LNTG (Liberian National Transitional Government in collaboration with ECOMOG shall ensure that no group or individuals bear arms in the perimeter of the capital. Concerning disarmament, the following are stipulated in Section E and Article 6 of the same Cotonou agreement:
Count 1: All weapons and warlike materials collected shall be stored by the ECOMOG in armouries designated by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by UN observers.
Count 2: All weapons and warlike materials in the possession of the
parties shall be given to ECOMOG in designated armouries.
Count 3: Said armouries shall be secured by the ECOMOG, monitored and verified by UN observers upon proper documentation or inventory of all weapons and warlike materials received.
Course 4: Each of the warring parties shall ensure that its combatants report all weapons and warlike materials to ECOMOG which would be inventories by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by the LNTG and UNOMIL. Upon proper
inventory such weapons and warlike materials, shall be taken by ECOMOG to the designated armouries,monitored and verified by UNOMIL and LNTG.
Count 5: All non-combatants who are in possession of weapons and warlike materials shall be reported and surrender same to ECOMOG, monitored and verified by LNTG and UNOMIL. Such weapons and warlike materials shall be
returned to the owner after due registration, licensing and certification by the governing authority after elections.
Count 6: The ECOMOG shall have the authority to disarm combatants or non-combatants in possession of weapons and warlike materials. The UNOMIL shall monitor all such activities.
Count 7: For the sole purpose of maintaining the ceasefire, ECOMOG shall conduct any such to recover lost or hidden weapons, observed and monitored by UNOMIL and LNTG. The parties agreed and fully committed themselves to the encampment of their combatants, and maintenance of command and control in
encampment centres, established by ECOMOG, UNOMIl and LNTG in collaboration with the parties. The encampment centres shall, in addition to disarmament and demobilization, serve as transit points for the further education, training and rehabilitation of said combatants. In pursuit of the above, the parties agreed to submit to the ECOMOG and the UNOMIL, complete lists of their combatants and weapons and warlike materials and their locations to the nearest encampment centres.
Conclusion/Summary
It would be noteworthy that governance plays a major role in the creation of the enabling environment of peace, security and stability. There must be genuine intentions. Dealing alone with such issues of negative peace like hijacking, kidnapping, sabotage and bunkering in the appraise the root causes of the conflict. Genuine peace effort in the Niger Delta should involve the participation of all stakeholders in the peacebuilding process. It is now obvious that for any development action, an understanding of the institutional conditions in which the action will take place should be a priority. In fact, an appropriate starting point towards achieving enduring peace in the region should consider efforts geared toward preventing an escalation of the conflict at same time not ignoring the interests and aspirations of the people. Sustainable peace in the should embrace options for positive peace, which revolves around addressing the issues of poverty, environmental devastation, political, economic and social justice, low level of literacy and unemployment. This forms the core of human security.
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